Employing Inconsistent Statements for Impeachment and as Substantive Evidence: A Critical Review and Proposed Amendments of Federal Rules of Evidence 801 ( d ) ( 1 ) ( A ), 613, and 607
Graham, Michael H.
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- 2012People v. Wilson Ill. App. Ct.
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- 1996State v. Newsome Conn.
- 1995People v. Hubbard Ill. App. Ct.
- 1992People v. Hallbeck Ill. App. Ct.
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Abstract
The Federal Rules of Evidence have already been employed as a model for the new Uniform Rules of Evidence and for several state codifications, and yet apparently none of the drafters of these schemes gave serious consideration either to expanding admissibility under 801(d)(1)(A) selectively or to controlling potential abuse regarding the use of prior inconsistent statements not substantively admissible. This Article, after exploring the history, development, and rationale of rules 801(d)(1)(A), 613, and 607, proposes that rules 613 and 607 be amended to bring their provisions into conformity with rule 801 (d) (1) (A). In the same vein, the Article also suggests that rule 801(d)(1)(A) unduly restricts the types of prior inconsistent statements substantively admissible thereunder. Accordingly, it proposes an amendment to rule 801(d)(1)(A) that expands the substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements while seeking to preserve the guarantees of reliability that Congress has seen fit to impose.