Burden of proof in fraud, foundation manager, and transferee cases
United States Code
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How this statute sits in the citation network, derived from CiteLaw's graph of published opinions.
★Highly CitedTop 3% most-cited · cited by 54 decisions
54
Citing decisions
6+
Courts citing
Citations by decade
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1950s1960s1970s1980s1990s2000s2010s2020s
Courts citing this statute
Most recently cited by10
- 2025NAPRSTEK v. NEWREZ A/K/A SHELLPOINT MORTGAGE SERVICING D.N.J.
- 2018Terrell v. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Terrell) Bankr. W.D. Okla.
- 2018United States v. Garrity D. Conn.
- 2016In re Wyly Bankr. N.D. Tex.
- 2012Williams v. Commissioner 4th Cir.
- 2011Langille v. Commissioner 11th Cir.
- 2009Kanter v. Commissioner 7th Cir.
- 2008Kosinski v. Commissioner 6th Cir.
- 2007Thompson v. United States N.D. Ala.
- 2007United States v. Windsor Capital Corp. D. Mass.
Counts reflect decisions in the CiteLaw corpus and may lag very recent opinions.
Text
In any proceeding involving the issue whether the petitioner has been guilty of fraud with intent to evade tax, the burden of proof in respect of such issue shall be upon the Secretary. In any proceeding involving the issue whether a foundation manager (as defined in section 4946(b)) has “knowingly” participated in an act of self-dealing (within the meaning of section 4941), participated in an investment which jeopardizes the carrying out of exempt purposes (within the meaning of section 4944), or agreed to the making of a taxable expenditure (within the meaning of section 4945), or whether the trustee of a trust described in section 501(c)(21) has “knowingly” participated in an act of self-dealing (within the meaning of section 4951) or agreed to the making of a taxable expenditure (within the meaning of section 4952), or whether an organization manager (as defined in section 4955(f)(2)) has “knowingly” agreed to the making of a political expenditure (within the meaning of section 4955), or whether an organization manager (as defined in section 4912(d)(2)) has “knowingly” agreed to the making of disqualifying lobbying expenditures within the meaning of section 4912(b), or whether an organization manager (as defined in section 4958(f)(2)) has “knowingly” participated in an excess benefit transaction (as defined in section 4958(c)), the burden of proof in respect of such issue shall be upon the Secretary. For provisions relating to burden of proof as to transferee liability, see section 6902(a). (Source: (Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 884; Pub. L. 91–172, title I, § 101(j)(57), Dec. 30, 1969, 83 Stat. 532; Pub. L. 94–455, title XIX, § 1906(b)(13)(A), Oct. 4, 1976, 90 Stat. 1834; Pub. L. 95–227, § 4(d)(7), Feb. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 23; Pub. L. 96–222, title I, § 108(b)(3)(B), Apr. 1, 1980, 94 Stat. 226; Pub. L. 100–203, title X, §§ 10712(c)(6), 10714(b), Dec. 22, 1987, 101 Stat. 1330–467, 1330–471; Pub. L. 104–168, title XIII, § 1311(c)(5), July 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 1478; Pub. L. 104–188, title I, § 1704(t)(43), Aug. 20, 1996, 110 Stat. 1889; Pub. L. 115–141, div. U, title IV, § 401(a)(329), Mar. 23, 2018, 132 Stat. 1200.))