Willfully Forgetting Miranda's True Nature: Vega V. Tekoh Severs the Warnings Requirement From the Constitution

This Article analyzes Vega v. Tekoh, in which the Supreme Court ruled that a violation of Miranda was not a violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. This Article examines the original language of the Miranda opinion, the statements and intentions of the members of the Miranda Court, and subsequent precedent to determine Miranda’s true nature. Further, this Article examines the reasoning of Vega and the dangers created by its pronouncements, especially in light of the Court’s earlier characterization of Miranda as a constitutional rule in Dickerson v. United States. This Article asserts that the Justices who joined the Miranda opinion clearly and repeatedly explained that Miranda’s warnings requirement was a constitutional right. Further, Miranda itself indicated that it was establishing a right included within the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Finally, this Article suggests that Vega’s cramped reasoning rejecting Miranda’s constitutional status, along with the Court’s inconsistent interpretation of Miranda over the decades, has not only fatally weakened Miranda’s warnings requirement but also undermined the Court’s own authority.