Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth" Theory in Perspective

Our article focuses primarily on one legal question: Does the wage discrimination theory, as sketched by Professor Blumrosen, fall within the remedial ambit of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act? Wage Discrimination's factual contentions as to the existence and universality of wage discrimination deserve equally detailed analysis, but we leave that task to scholars of the pertinent disciplines, sociology and economics. We will deal with the factual contentions of Wage Discrimination only so far as necessary to challenge its central factual conclusion: that a demonstration of job separation should lead to a judicial inference of wage discrimination. This assertion is crucial to Professor Blumrosen's argument because it is the basis for the proposal that incumbents of sex- or race-separated jobs are entitled, by virtue of their jobs alone, to higher wages.

Because her social science evidence is unpersuasive and her legal analysis is unsound, we conclude that the courts and the Congress have been wise in refraining from attempts to impose the "comparable worth" theory on the American economy.