The Rights of the Person Acquitted by Reason of Insanity: Equal Protection and Due Process

In response to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's decision in State v. Shackford a commentator suggested that the Maine automatic commitment statute be attacked as denying equal protection of the laws to those individuals acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect. Such an attack was made in the case of Chase v. Kearns, but without the predicted success. In Chase the court failed to come to grips with the crucial issues presented despite careful effort by both counsel to focus on the constitutional problems. The court side-stepped the difficult constitutional issues raised, upholding the statute but failing to provide any sound basis for its decision.

Traditional justifications for automatic commitment were reiterated with no inquiry into their validity in light of contemporary knowledge and values. The law relating to the fights of those acquitted by reason of insanity suffers from a lack of sound legal reasoning. It has been confused by the interaction of conflicting beliefs. On the one hand, there exists a feeling, demonstrated by the fact that insanity is an absolute defense rather than a mitigating circumstance, that it is unfair to punish a person for a criminal act caused by his mental illness; no fault is perceived on the part of the actor and no benefit anticipated from his retributive imprisonment.

On the other hand, because of the relatively late development of the psychological sciences and the uncertain effectiveness of treatment, society is afraid of the mentally ill, and even more so of those whose antisocial behavior has also been in contravention of the law. This fear of the person acquitted by reason of insanity is largely responsible for the enactment of criminal commitment statutes like Maine's and for unwaivering judicial support of such statutes in the face of legal attack.