The Retrieval of the Democratic Ethos

For over thirty years I have been a sympathetic although critical reader of Habermas. Initially, I was struck by his nuanced insight into the American pragmatic tradition and his appropriation of the radical democratic ethos of the pragmatic movement. I felt then, and still believe, that Habermas has a more profound and subtle understanding of what is best and most enduring in pragmatism-especially in the thought of Peirce, Dewey, and Mead-than many of my American colleagues. I was also attracted to Habermas for other reasons.

He is a dialectical thinker who has the courage to buck fashionable trends-who refuses to get on the bandwagon that celebrates difference, fragmentation, alterity, and singularity, and that damns rationality, universality, intersubjectivity, and normative validity. Although frequently caricatured by his opponents, Habermas has never flinched from defending what he takes to be valid in the Enlightenment legacy-the striving for human autonomy and emancipation from all forms of oppression. He has never been cowered by the shrill rhetoric that condemns all forms of humanism. He has resisted the sneer of cynicism that sees only undifferentiated manipulative power everywhere.

It would be difficult to name another twentieth century thinker who has taken the idea and practice of public debate and dialogue more seriously. Habermas is constantly engaging his critics-seeking to learn from them, defending his convictions, and modifying and abandoning claims when challenged by good reasons.