The “Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice

Guthrie, Chris, Rachlinski, Jeffrey J. & Wistrich, Andrew J.

Journal: Duke Law Journal

Volume: 58

First Page: 1477

Year: 2009

Bluebook Citation: 58 DUKE L.J. 1477 (2009)

Author: Chris Guthrie: all 25 publications


Abstract

Administrative law judges attract little scholarly attention, yet they decide a large fraction of all civil disputes. In this Article, we demonstrate that these executive branch judges, like their counterparts in the judicial branch, tend to make predominantly intuitive rather than predominantly deliberative decisions. This finding sheds new light on executive branch justice by suggesting that judicial intuition, not judicial independence, is the most significant challenge facing these important judicial officers.

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