The Court Loses its Way with the Global Positioning System: United States v. Jones Retreats to the “Classic Trespassory Search”

Dery III, George M. & Evaro, Ryan

Journal: Michigan Journal of Race and Law

Volume: 19

First Page: 113

Year: 2013

Bluebook Citation: 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 113 (2013)

Author: George M. Dery Iii: all 21 publications


Abstract

This Article analyzes United States v. Jones, in which the Supreme Court considered whether government placement of a global positioning system (GPS) device on a vehicle to follow a person’s movements constituted a Fourth Amendment “search.” The Jones Court ruled that two distinct definitions existed for a Fourth Amendment “search.” In addition to Katz v. United States’s reasonable-expectation-of-privacy standard, which the Court had used exclusively for over four decades, the Court recognized a second kind of search that it called a “classic trespassory search.” The second kind of search occurs when officials physically trespass or intrude upon a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information. This work examines the concerns created by Jones’s ruling. This Article asserts that, by emphasizing property rights in bringing back the decades-old physical trespass test, Jones potentially undermined the Katz standard. Further, Jones added an inquiry into motivation by asking if the government committed the intrusion to obtain information, thus creating a subjective inquiry that is inconsistent with much of Fourth Amendment doctrine.

Finally, in its attempt to distinguish its facts from earlier vehicle-tracking cases, the Court created a loophole in Fourth Amendment application that law enforcement could exploit in the future.

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