Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules or Predilective Tools

Durden, Stephen M.

Journal: Campbell Law Review

Volume: 33

First Page: 115

Year: 2010

Bluebook Citation: 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 115 (2010)

Author: Stephen M. Durden: all 5 publications


Abstract

This Article uses canons of construction to demonstrate that textualism, particularly plain language or plain meaning textualism, cannot be applied without the use of non-textual personal choices. But, this Article does not seek to demonstrate that interpreting the Constitution requires ignoring the text of the Constitution; nor does this Article seek to demonstrate that textualist approaches lack relevance or value. Rather, this Article seeks to demonstrate that textualism cannot create rules that avoid personal predilections and does not create neutral principles or eliminate predilective interpretation. In order to accomplish this goal, this Article reviews a variety of canons of construction and applies them to the Takings Clause.

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