Super Deference and Heightened Scrutiny

Adler, Jonathan H.

Journal: Florida Law Review

Volume: 74

First Page: 267

Year: 2022

Bluebook Citation: 74 FLA. L. REV. 267 (2022)

Author: Jonathan H. Adler: all 36 publications


Abstract

Judicial review of federal agency action is systematically deferential. Such deference is arguably at its peak where agencies address scientific and highly technical matters within their area of expertise. This is what some call “super deference.” While there may be strong arguments for deferential review of agency scientific determinations as a general matter, there are reasons to question such deference when agency action implicates constitutional concerns. In particular, where agency actions trigger heightened scrutiny, such as occurs when agency actions intrude upon expressly enumerated or otherwise recognized fundamental rights or adopt constitutionally suspect classifications, courts should not apply traditional levels of deference.

This Article explains why the application of so-called “super deference” is inappropriate where federal agency action triggers heightened scrutiny and considers some of the potential implications of such a rule.

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