Sneak in Contracts

Consumer contracts are a pervasive legal tool that governmany of our daily activities. Yet, consumer contracts areroutinely modified by businesses after customers accept them.Common modifications include, for example, a change in fees,alteration of a dispute resolution clause, or revision to the firm’sprivacy policy. In fact, unilateral modifications can affectvirtually every aspect of a contract.While the literature widely discusses the problem of ex anteconsent to consumer contracts, it does not adequately addressthe problem of ex post consent to unilateral modifications. Butthe practice of unilateral changes to consumer form contractscomes with significant detriments and social costs.

Despitethese costs, there are no systematic empirical studies exploringthis phenomenon. This Article aims to fill this gap byempirically examining the frequency, mechanics, and degree oftransparency of unilateral change mechanisms in consumercontracts.This Article examines 500 sign-in-wrap contracts of the mostpopular websites in the United States that use such agreements.We find that the vast majority of consumer contracts in oursample are “sneak in” contracts—that is, they allow firms unilateral and broad discretion to covertly change consumers’rights and obligations after consumers accept them. Thisstudy’s findings raise concerns as to whether sneak in contractsare aligned with prominent core values and principles ofcontract law, such as consent, promise, reliance, consideration,freedom, choice, empowerment, and community. The study thuscalls for greater transparency in the law that governs themodification of consumer contracts.