Rule of Law and International Human Rights

This article reviews the field of international human rights with particular attention to the way that the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, the Human Rights Committee, and local domestic courts operate to resolve human rights cases. It first notes what internationally recognized human rights there are and the sources that give rise to them. It then explains how relativism enters human rights decision-making, especially at the domestic court level, in part because a common grounding for the human rights propounded was never adopted. Even at the level of the International Court of Justice, its failure to include an ethical modality in the way it interprets treaties generally, and human rights treaties, in particular, can leave it floundering to present any consistent framework for its own human rights decision-making.

The article then presents a philosophical theory to justify the human rights that are recognized, based on an objective criterion that can be developed to assist courts in deciding conflicts of rights cases. Especially with respect to state domestic courts, the International Court of Justice can serve as a model to be emulated were it to adopt this theoretical frameworkfor future human rights decision-making.