Retribution in Criminal Theory

I will focus on three separate but intimately related dimensions of what I have identified as Moore's central theme. In Part H, I examine his views about the data from which a theory of the criminal law is to be constructed. In Part I, I discuss his account of the rationale of punishment. In Part IV, I scrutinize his defense of legal moralism as a theory of legislative aim.

I express general misgivings about the extraordinarily central place Moore affords retribution in his account of the criminal law as it exists today. I want to stress at the outset, however, that I regard my commentary as friendly. Like Moore, I am overwhelmingly sympathetic to retributivism. My support for retributivism, however, is more tempered.

No contemporary criminal theorist rivals Moore in his unqualified enthusiasm for retribution. My reservations will seem minor and inconsequential to theorists whose opposition to retributivism is more basic and fundamental than mine.