Regulatory Bundling

Jennifer Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz

Journal: Yale Law Journal

Volume: 128

Year: 2019

Bluebook Citation: 128 YALE L.J. (2019)

Author: Edward H. Stiglitz: all 6 publications


Abstract

Regulatory bundling is the aggregation or disaggregation of legislative rules by administrative agencies. Agencies, in other words, can bundle what would otherwise be multiple rules into just one rulemaking. Conversely, they can split one rule into several. This observation parallels other recent work on how agencies can aggregate adjudications and enforcement actions but now focuses on legislative rules, the most consequential form of agency action.

The topic is timely in light of a recent executive order directing agencies to repeal two regulations for every new one promulgated. Agencies now have a greater incentive to pack regulatory provisions together for every two rules they can repeal.

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