Regulating the Rulemakers: A Proposal for Deliberative Cost-Benefit Analysis

Jennifer Nou

Journal: Yale Law & Policy Review

Volume: 26

First Page: 601

Year: 2008

Bluebook Citation: 26 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 601 (2008)

Author: Jennifer Nou: all 10 publications


Abstract

How should democratic societies regulate their rulemakers? As administrative agencies grapple with novel challenges-from the environment, to public health, and now, to terrorism -- perennial questions reemerge. Chief among them are the appropriate limits of bureaucratic discretion amidst competing demands for expertise and public participation. Indeed, modern risks are increasingly complex.

We need experts for sober insights into the consequences of our regulatory choices. Only then will administrative decision-making be informed. Yet, these same risks also breed greater uncertainties and, thus, harder political decisions. Even more urgent, then, becomes the need to ensure those decisions are transparent and accountable.

Only then will administrative decision- making be legitimate.

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