Paying Physicians More to Do Less: Financial Incentives to Limit Care

Orentlicher, David

Journal: University of Richmond Law Review

Volume: 30

First Page: 155

Year: 1996

Bluebook Citation: 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155 (1996)

Author: David Orentlicher: all 29 publications


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Abstract

As the explosion in health care costs has led to serious ef- forts at cost containment, concerns have been raised that some of the methods used to contain costs may cause more harm than good. In particular, many commentators have criticized the practice of giving physicians personal financial incentives to limit the provision of care to their patients. These critics have argued that, if physicians are paid more to do less, patients will suffer harm from undertreated illness, and patient trust in the patient-physician relationship will be seriously compromised. Accordingly, it is argued, financial incentives for physicians to limit care should not be used' and should even be prohibited.

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