Limiting Article III Standing to "Accidental" Plaintiffs: Lessons from Environmental and Animal Law Cases

According to the Supreme Court, Article III's extensionof "judicialPower" to "Cases" and "Controversies"limitsstanding to plaintiffs who can demonstrate anindividualized "injury in fact" that was caused by thedefendant and that is judicially redressable. Article III'stext and history, however, do not mention "injury,""causation,"or "redressability."Furthermore, these standards are malleable and havebeen applied to achieve ideological goals, especially incases involving environmental and animal-welfare laws.Most notably, the Court has recognized an "injury in fact"to one's aesthetic enjoyment of nature, but determiningsuch an injury is arbitrarybecause "aesthetics"is a matterof personal taste. Judges have exercised similar unbridleddiscretion in ascertaining causation and redressability.The result has often been a judicial takeover of importantpolicy issues.Standing decisions are so inconsistent and politicizedthat most scholars have recommended abandoning thedoctrine. However, stare decisis will prevent such aradical change.

Therefore, I offer a more realisticapproach that retains the existing standingframework butmodifies its elements. My touchstone is the historicalmeaning of an Article III "case," which restricts courtaccess to plaintiffs whose legal rights have been invadedfortuitously because of a chance event beyond their control.Applying this test, courts would find an "injury in fact"only when it befell a plaintiff by accident, not whensomeone manufactured a lawsuit by claiming "aesthetic"harm. Insisting on a fortuitous injury would also make it far easier to determine who caused it and whether theremedy requested would redress it.