Levels of Generality, the Limits of Originalism, and the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment Jurisprudence

Just how originalist is the Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence after United States v. Rahimi? This is perhaps one of the biggest questions left in the decision’s wake. As it turns out, the answer is not altogether clear post-Rahimi. This is because the case produced some seven separate opinions, many of which—even though they agree as to the bottom line—get there by very different paths.

This Article suggests that Rahimi, perhaps more than any other recent decision by the Court, underscores the crucial role that levels of generality in constitutional interpretation play, while illustrating the problems with originalism and how, when faced with a choice between strict adherence to originalism’s core ideals and avoiding deeply undesirable results, many justices—even those who purport to be originalists—will forsake originalism for a far more pragmatic approach to constitutional interpretation. In the end, when the various opinions in Rahimi are dissected, one finds considerable support for the notion that the Justices are “look[ing] for the central purposes of the relevant constitutional provision and tr[ying] to apply it in a vastly different world.” Whatever it is, such an approach is decidedly not originalism.