Lead Plaintiff Incentives in Aggregate Litigation
Korsmo, Charles R. & Myers, Minor
Citation analytics
How this journal article sits in the citation network, derived from CiteLaw's graph of published opinions.
Most recently cited by4
- 2026Dollens v. Goosehead Insurance, Inc.
- 2026In re Orbit/FR, Inc. Stockholders Litig. Del. Ch.
- 2023In re Dell Technologies Inc. Class V Stockholders Litigation Del. Ch.
- 2023In re Fox Corporation Derivative Litigation Del. Ch.
Counts reflect decisions in the CiteLaw corpus and may lag very recent opinions.
Abstract
The lead plaintiff role holds out considerable promise in promoting the deterrence and compensation goals of aggregate litigation. The prevailing approach to compensating lead plaintiffs, however, provides no real incentive for a lead plaintiff to bring claims on behalf of a broader group. The policy challenge is to induce sophisticated parties to press claims not in their individual capacity but instead in a representative capacity, conferring a positive externality on all class members by identifying attractive claims, financing ongoing litigation, and managing the work of attorneys. We outline what an active and engaged lead plaintiff could add to the civil enforcement regime and propose a set of reforms designed induce that engagement.
In particular, we argue that courts should be open to awarding lead plaintiffs amounts that are roughly equal in magnitude to those awarded to lead counsel.