Into the Void: The GAO's Role in the Regulartory State

Bridget C.E. Dooling

Journal: American University Law Review

Volume: 70

Year: 2020

Bluebook Citation: 70 AM. U. L. REV. (2020)

Author: Bridget C. E. Dooling: all 9 publications


Abstract

The study of Congress largely focuses on its members, committees, and leaders. Meanwhile, the study of federal agencies tends to focus on those that fall within the executive branch. But many agencies and institutions exist to support Congress, and administrative law and political science scholarship has largely overlooked their internal operations. Far more than ministerial, some of these agencies have the ability to shape policy in very meaningful ways.

They also have their own institutional interests distinct from the legislators they serve. As instruments of Congress, though, these agencies are generally exempt from the Administrative Procedure Act and a host of other “good government” statutes that govern agency conduct. This does not mean that they operate in a lawless fashion. Instead, other statutes and internal norms guide their conduct.

This Article suggests what we might learn from closer study of these understudied agencies.

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