How Qualified Immunity Fails

Joanna C. Schwartz

Journal: Yale Law Journal

Volume: 127

Year: 2017

Bluebook Citation: 127 YALE L.J. (2017)

Author: Joanna C. Schwartz: all 17 publications


Abstract

This Article reports the findings of the largest and most comprehensive study to date of the role qualified immunity plays in constitutional litigation. Qualified immunity shields government officials from constitutional claims for money damages so long as the officials did not violate clearly established law. The Supreme Court has described the doctrine as incredibly strong- protecting "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Legal scholars and commentators describe qualified immunity in equally stark terms, often criticiz­ing the doctrine for closing the courthouse doors to plaintiffs whose rights have been violated. The Court has repeatedly explained that qualified immunity must be as powerful as it is to pro­tect government officials from burdens associated with participating in discovery and trial.

Yet the Supreme Court has relied on no empirical evidence to support its assertion that qualified immunity doctrine shields government officials from these assumed burdens.

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