Hidden Contracts

Becher, Shmuel I. & Benoliel, Uri

Journal: BYU Law Review

Volume: 49

First Page: 307

Year: 2023

Bluebook Citation: 49 BYU L. REV. 307 (2023)

Author: Uri Benoliel: all 10 publications


Abstract

Transparency is a promising means for enhancing democratic values, countering corruption, and reducing power abuse. Nonetheless, the potential of transparency in the domain of consumer contracts is untapped. This Article suggests utilizing the power of transparency to increase consumer access to justice, better distribute technological gains between businesses and consumers, and deter sellers from breaching their consumer contracts while exploiting consumers’ inferior position. In doing so, this Article focuses on what we dub “Hidden Contracts.” Part I conceptualizes the idea of hidden contracts.

It first defines hidden contracts as consumer form contracts that firms unilaterally modify and subsequently remove from the public sphere, despite being binding on consumers. Thereafter, the Article delineates the considerable social costs of hidden contracts. Given these social costs, Part II discusses our empirical study of hidden contracts. The results of this study indicate that leading firms that supply goods and services to billions of online consumers worldwide routinely employ hidden contracts to the detriment of consumers and society.

Against this background, Part III proposes introducing a novel contract transparency duty. It further explains how to design this duty to counter firms’ incentive to employ hidden contracts. Next, Part IV tackles key objections to our proposal. Concluding remarks follow.

Chat with this journal article using AI

Ask CiteLaw's AI Navigator anything about this journal article, verify citations, and research related authorities. Sign up for CiteLaw free today to get started.