Grossly Restricted Pleading: Twombly/Iqbal, Gross, and Cannibalistic Facts in Compound Employment Discrimination Claims

Over its last three terms, the United States Supreme Court has drastically altered the pleading standards for civil actions. Beginning in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,1 and concluding with Ashcroft v. Iqbal,2 the Court redefined the requirements of notice pleading under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and the standard of review on motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court jettisoned the notion that a complaint which merely gave the defendant notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the basis thereof was sufficient under Rule (8)(a)(2) and also jettisoned the “any set of facts” standard for motions to dismiss from Conley v. Gibson.3 In place of the long-standing principles, the Court created so-called “plausibility” pleading and held that a plaintiff in a civil action must plead facts—as opposed to conclusions—sufficient to state a claim that is plausible on its face.