From the Regulatory Abyss: The Weakened Gatekeeping Incentives under the Uniform Securities Act

Marc L Steinberg & James Ames

Journal: Yale Law & Policy Review

Volume: 35

Year: 2017

Bluebook Citation: 35 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. (2017)

Author: Marc L. Steinberg: all 1 publication


Abstract

Under the Uniform Securities Act (Act or USA), in-house accountants, analysts, attorneys, and other inside gatekeepers may be held responsible for running afoul of the secondary liability provisions of the USA, while their outside counterparts will escape liability. As a result, an inherent inequity in treatment exists between inside and outside actors in private state securities litigation.

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