Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory

Guthrie, Chris

Journal: University of Chicago Law Review

Volume: 67

Year: 2000

Bluebook Citation: 67 U. CHI. L. REV. (2000)

Author: Chris Guthrie: all 25 publications


Abstract

This Article uses an often-overlooked component of prospect theory to develop a positive theory of frivolous or low-probability litigation. The proposed Frivolous Framing Theory posits that the decision frame in frivolous litigation induces risk-seeking behavior in plaintiffs and risk-averse behavior in defendants. Because plaintiffs in frivolous litigation have a greater tolerance for risk than the defendants they have sued, plaintiffs in frivolous litigation have "psychological leverage" in settlement negotiations, which is likely to lead to plaintiff-friendly settlements or bargaining impasse. This, in turn, suggests that reformers concerned about frivolous litigation should target reform efforts at plaintiffs' decisionmaking in frivolous suits.

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