DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN STATE LABOR LEGISLATION

With this material in mind, is it possible to arrive at any useful conclusions as to what constitutes due process of law in labor legislation? In each group of cases, there seem to be two distinct, though inseparable functions of the judicial process of reviewing the legislation in question. The courts, in brief, are arriving at conclusions both of fact and of law. The impression was, at one time prevalent that the extent of review of certain types of labor legislation was limited to the reasonableness of the' statute as respects the end sought and the means of attaining that end, upon the facts as presented to the court.

The same was contended with respect to legislative review in other fields, for example, review of rate fixing activities of administrative boards. It was thought that the court could not substitute its own conclusions of fact for the findings of the board or legislature. But this position seems to have been abandoned as far as rates were concerned since 1920, and so far as labor legislation was concerned, courts have long since done what amounted to arriving at independent findings of fact. It has been a necessary complement to determining the question of law involved, for it is impossible to find the law until the facts are determined.