Dodd-Frank Is a Pigouvian Regulation

Aaron M Levine & Joshua C. Macey

Journal: Yale Law Journal

Volume: 127

Year: 2018

Bluebook Citation: 127 YALE L.J. (2018)

Author: Aaron M. Levine: all 2 publications


Abstract

Almost eight years after the passage of Dodd-Frank, financial institutions remain large, complex, and interconnected. Academics and policymakers across the ideological spectrum largely agree that Dodd-Frank has imposed substantial compliance costs on systematically important financial institutions (SIFis) without solving the problem that they are too big to fail. This Note argues that Dodd-Frank's compliance costs have actually served an important regulatory purpose. By analyzing the spinoffs and divestitures that have occurred at eleven SIFis since Dodd-Frank went into effect in 2010, this Note documents the extent to which the Act's compliance costs have led SIFis to shed business lines of their own accord.

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