Decentralizing Cap-and-Trade? The Question of State Stringency

This Article addresses a critical question about a state's role in the operation of a national cap-and-trade program: whether federal legislation should allow states to be more stringent than the federal government. ... This Article is the first in a series that will address the wisdom of allowing state control within a federal trading system. ...Part II of this Article articulates the primary justifications for allowing states to set more stringent caps. ...Part III turns to practical mechanisms to achieve state stringency. ...Part IV articulates the potential adverse impacts that could result from states using these mechanisms to achieve more stringent goals. ...Part V concludes that, on balance, state stringency is justified. ...Part VI briefly articulates some of the implications of the foregoing analysis for federal legislation....The Article addresses only a potential "downstream" cap-and-trade program focused on stationary sources-a program that would impose allowance requirements on the actual emitters of GHGs. It does not address an "upstream" program that would impose requirements on entities like oil producers, mining companies, the transportation sector, or other entities that are upstream from, and do not directly cause emissions. This Article also focuses on the wisdom of designing federal legislation to incorporate state control, not judicial standards for determining whether and to what degree federal legislation, once designed, preempts state action.