CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-LIMITATIONS ON USE OF SOUND AMPLIFICATION DEVICES
Goldstone S. Ed., Bernard
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Abstract
Appellant used sound equipment mounted on his truck to comment on a labor dispute. He was convicted in a police court of violating a city ordinance which prohibited the use on any public street of sound amplifying devices emitting loud and raucous noises. The intermediate court of appeal of New Jersey, in affirming the conviction, construed the ordinance to be an absolute prohibition. The conviction was sustained on appeal to the highest court of New Jersey by an evenly divided court of twelve justices.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. Justice Reed, joined by Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Burton, found that the ordinance was not a denial of due process of law in that it was sufficiently definite and did not constitute an abridgment of free speech. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson concurred specially. Four justices dissented.
Kovacs v. Cooper, (U.S. 1949) 69 S. Ct. 448.