Can Investment Dispute Settlement Ever Be Depoliticized?

Investor-state arbitration was created with the hope of depoliticizing investment disputes. However, the adoption of the traditional party-appointment system, in which disputing parties play a direct role in the composition of the tribunal, is increasingly criticized. Many believe that party appointment is a tool ofpolitical influence over the arbitrators' interpretative space. Suggestions for reform of the system have proliferated.

The most radical proposal currently on the table-the creation of a permanent investment court-would cause a paradigm shift in the selection of adjudicators, moving from a disputing party framework, to a treaty party context. This article analyzes different options to reduce political influence in the selection process and discusses their potential effectiveness. It concludes that proposed alternatives to the party-appointed regime can only help to mitigate, but never completely dispel, the risk ofpolitical contamination ofthe process through which investment adjudicators are selected.