ANY MORE LIGHT ON HADDOCK v. HADDOCK? THE PROBLEM OF DOMICIL IN DIVORCE

AT first glance it seems a work of foolhardiness or of supererogation to embark upon a rediscussion of any problems arising from Haddock v. Haddock. True, the decision of the majority of the Supreme Court in that case has not won wholehearted support from the bench or legal profession. True it is, also, that collusive divorces still flourish. These considerations alone might, perhaps, lead the reader to concede that it would not be unfruitful to speculate upon an eventual modification of some of the principles which the Court in that case approved.

If, however, further justification is demanded of the writer for the course he is about to take, he begs the reader to keep in mind that the progress of legal thought during the last three decades and a half may have brought about a modification of the reasoning upon which the Supreme Court based its decision. Courts have a tendency to utilize changes in the content of concepts in one type of case as a justification for making similar alterations in the content of the same or similar concepts in another field of litigation. This tendency may be especially strong when there has been marked popular or professional disapproval of judicial development in the latter field.