Adding A Data Disclosure Requirement to the FAA: An Overdue Reform

Frankel, Richard

Journal: American University Business Law Review

Volume: 14

Year: 2025

Bluebook Citation: 14 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. (2025)

Author: Richard H. Frankel: all 13 publications

Abstract

American University Business Law Review American University Business Law Review

Article 4

Adding A Data Disclosure Requirement to the FAA: An Overdue Adding A Data Disclosure Requirement to the FAA: An Overdue

Reform Reform

Richard Frankel Drexel University Law School, [email protected]

American University Business Law Review American University Business Law Review

Article 4

Adding A Data Disclosure Requirement to the FAA: An Overdue Adding A Data Disclosure Requirement to the FAA: An Overdue

Reform Reform

Richard Frankel

ADDIN(cid:42)ADATADISCLOSURE RE(cid:52)UIREMENTTOTHEFAA: ANOVERDUEREFORM

I.Introduction...........................................................................................577 II.ThePatchworkLandscapeofArbitrationDataCollectionand

Disclosure.......................................................................................580 III.ProblemswithAccesstoData............................................................584 A.LimitationsofAvailableData...................................................584 B.InequityinDataAccess............................................................587 IV.AmendingtheFAAtoRequireDataCollectionandDisclosure........589 A.TheStatuteShouldIdentifytheInformationtobeDisclosed...590 B.TheStatuteShouldIdentifyWhohasReportingObligations...593 C.TheInformationDisclosedUndertheStatuteShouldbe

PubliclyAvailableatNoCharge.............................................594

D.TheStatuteShouldContainMeaningfulEnforcement

Mechanisms.............................................................................595

E.CongressShould(cid:42)rantaFederalAgencyAuthorityto

AdministertheStatute.............................................................596 V.Conclusion...........................................................................................598

Artificial

intelligence(AI)andpredictiveanalyticsaretransforming almosteverysectorofsociety.Thefieldofdisputeresolutionisno exceptiontothistrend.Lawyersinemergingdisputesarehungryfordata aboutarbitratorsand(cid:77)udges,priordecisions,similardisputes,andanything theirhandson.1Westlaw,Lexis,andotherlegal elsetheycanget informationcompaniesnowprovideAItoolsandpredictiveanalytic

algorithmsforusers.2 Partiesandresearchers(cid:179)text-mine(cid:180)arbitration awards tobetterunderstandarbitrationdecision-makingandmake predictionsforthefuture.3Scholarsandadvocatesseekinformationto systematicallystudydisputeresolutionstructures,andgreatertransparency inarbitrationiscrucialforitslegitimacy.Inshort,informationhasbecome apreciousresourceinalternativedisputeresolution.

Despitethewidespreaddesireforarbitration-relateddata,accesstothat dataisunevenlydistributedandsub(cid:77)ecttoapatchworkofvaried,and sometimesconflicting,rulesandpractices.TheFederalArbitrationAct (FAA)(cid:178)thecentury-oldfederalstatutethatsetsparametersonarbitration intheUnitedStates(cid:178)containsnoprovisionregardingthecollectionand disclosureofinformationrelatedtoarbitration.4Variousentitieshave attemptedtofillthisgapintheFAA(cid:182)sstatutoryframework.Ahandfulof stateshaveadoptedlawsrequiringarbitrationproviderstodisclosedata aboutarbitrationsfallingwithintheparticularstate(cid:182)s(cid:77)urisdiction.5Private companieshavecollecteddataanddevelopedAItoolsforthoseplayers thatcanaffordtheirservices.6Somearbitrationprovidersvoluntarily discloseinformationaboutthearbitrationstheyadminister,buttheamount andtypeofinformationtheydisclosevariesbyprovider.7Withoutany nationalstandard,thisvariabilitywillundoubtedlycontinue.

ThisessayurgesCongresstoamendtheFAAtorequirearbitration providerstoreportdataonthearbitrationstheyadminister.8Additionally, theFAAshouldrequirepartiesinarbitrationproceedingstosubmitdataon arbitrationsinwhichtheyparticipate(cid:178)withsomeexceptionstoprotect againstimposingundueburdens(cid:178)inordertocaptureinformationthatan arbitrationproviderwouldnothavebutthatanarbitrationpartymight.

relevantor

Finally,Congressshouldauthori(cid:93)eafederalagencytoadministerand enforcethisstatuteandshoulddelegatetotheagencytheauthorityto promulgaterulesorguidancedefiningthetypesofinformationthatmustbe disclosed.Thisauthorityisimportantbecausetheinformationthatwillbe most time,andthe governmentneedssomeflexibilitytoupdatethecategoriesofdatathatan arbitrationproviderorpartyshouldprovide.Forexample,onlinedispute resolutionlikelywasnotontheCalifornialegislature(cid:182)sradarwhenthat statefirstenacteditsarbitrationdisclosurestatutein2003,9buttherelative meritsofremoteversusin-personarbitrationisnowapressingissue.10

islikelytochangeover

important

Addingadatareportingrequirement

intotheFAAoffersseveral advantages.First,itwouldcreateanationallyuniformstandardthatall arbitrationprovidersanduserscouldfollow.Thisnationalstandardwould beafloor.Statescouldcreatemorestringentrequirementsiftheychoose, andarbitrationproviderscouldvoluntarilydiscloseadditionaldatabeyond whattheFAArequired,iftheysochoose.Second,itwouldmakedata accessibletoeveryoneratherthanonlytothosewhocanaffordit. Currently,wealthypartiescanpayforservicesthatgivethemaccessto arbitrationdata,whilethosewithmorelimitedfinancialresourcescannot. Makingdatapubliclyavailablewouldhelpshrinkthegapbetweenhaves andhave-nots.Third,afederal lawbackedbyfederalenforcement authoritycouldimprovecompliancebyarbitrationproviders,whichhas beenaconcernwithrespecttostatelawsonarbitrationdatadisclosure. Finally,thischangeisfeasibleandnotundulyburdensome.Arbitration providersarealreadyrequiredtocollectandpostsomedatatocomplywith therequirementsofthosestatesthathaveenacteddisclosurelaws.Thus, theyhavethetoolstocomplywithafederaldisclosurelawandwouldnot facesubstantialnewburdens.

Thisessayproceedsasfollows.PartIIlaysoutthepresentlandscapeof arbitrationdatacollectionanddisclosure,fromstatutoryrequirementsto regulatoryobligationstovoluntarypractices.PartIIIidentifiesseveral limitationsofthecurrentpractices,includinggapsinthetypeofdata reported,noncomplianceundercurrentrules,andhowinequalityofaccess resultswhenprivatecompaniescollectandprovidedatatothosewhoare ableandwillingtopayforit.PartIVurgesthattheFAAbeamendedto requiredatadisclosureanddescribeswhatdatashouldbedisclosed,who

shouldberequiredtoreportdata,howthedatashouldbemadepublicly available,howtoensurecompliancebycoveredparties,andtheimportance ofgivingafederalagencyoversightandrulemakingauthoritywithrespect todatacollectionanddisclosure.

Incontrast

Thosewhostudyandparticipateinarbitrationhavelongbeeninterested ingatheringdataaboutthearbitrationprocess,andhavelonghaddifficulty indoingso. litigation, commercialarbitrationisaprivatematter.Asaresult,informationabout arbitrationislessfreelyavailablethanitisforlitigation.Arbitration scholarsandpractitionersfrequentlylamentthescarcityofdataabout privatearbitration.11Somehavecharacteri(cid:93)edarbitrationasa(cid:179)blackhole(cid:180) orasecretproceeding.12(cid:60)et,despitetheroadblockstocollecting

tothepublicnatureofin-court

information,arbitrationstakeholdersemphasi(cid:93)ethathavingdataon arbitrationiscrucialforbeingabletoadvocatefortheirclientsasbestas possible.13(cid:42)reatertransparencyalsocouldpromotegreateraccountability andhelpbuildconfidenceinarbitrationasasystemofdisputeresolution.14 Althoughsomedataonarbitrationcasesandoutcomesalreadyis(oris requiredtobe)disclosed,currentdisclosurerequirementsarelimitedand imperfect.Onlyasmallnumberofstates(cid:178)California,Maryland,Maine, New(cid:45)ersey,andtheDistrictofColumbia(cid:178)haveenactedlawsrequiring arbitrationprovidersofacertainsi(cid:93)etosubmitdataregardingvarious aspectsofthearbitrationstheyconduct.15Typically,thesestatutesrequire todiscloseinformationaboutconsumerand arbitrationproviders employmentmattersonly.16Forexample,California(cid:182)sdisclosurestatute appliestoconsumermattersandrequiresarbitrationproviderstodisclose (1)whetherthearbitrationwassoughtpursuanttoapre-disputemandatory arbitrationclause(cid:30)(2)thenameofthenon-consumerparty(cid:30)(3)thetypeof dispute(e.g.,banking,insurance,healthcare,debt,employment)(cid:30)(4)which partyprevailed(cid:30)(5)howoftenthenon-consumerpartyhasbeenapartyin mediationsorarbitrationsadministeredbythearbitrationprovider(cid:30)(6) whetherthepartieswererepresentedbyanattorney(cid:30)(7)thedatethecase wasfiledandthedateitwasdecided(tohelpdeterminethelengthof proceedings)(cid:30)(8)thetypeofdisposition(cid:30)(9)theamountoftheclaimand theamountofthereliefgranted,ifany(cid:30)(10)thenameofthearbitrator,the totalfee,andthepercentageofthefeebornebyeachpartytothe arbitration(cid:30)and(11)aggregatedemographicdataof thecompany(cid:182)s arbitratorsalongvariousdimensions, includingrace,ethnicity,gender, sexualorientation,disability,andveteranstatus.17Otherstatestatutes

largelymirrorCalifornia(cid:182)sdisclosurelaw,18withminorvariationsrelating tothenameoftheconsumer(cid:182)sattorney,descriptionoftheconsumercase type,andidentificationofwhetherthearbitrationproviderhasafinancial interestinoneofthepartiesinthearbitration.19Althoughthestatutes coverinformationlikethesi(cid:93)eofanarbitrationaward,theydonotrequire disclosureofanarbitrator(cid:182)swrittendecision, to(cid:77)udicial opinions,whicharemadepubliclyavailable.

incontrast

Theselawsrequirearbitrationprovidersnot(cid:77)usttocollectthisdata,but alsotomakeitavailableonaquarterlybasisinaspreadsheetorother computer-searchableformat. TheAmericanArbitrationAssociation (AAA)and(cid:45)AMS,twoofthenation(cid:182)slargestarbitrationproviders,allow anymemberofthepublictodownloadtheirdisclosuresfromtheir websites.20

thefederal

level,datadisclosureislimitedtosecurities-related disputesbetweeninvestorsandbroker-dealers.TheFinancialIndustry RegulatoryAuthority(FINRA)isaquasi-governmentalorgani(cid:93)ationthat supervisesfinancialadvisorsandsecuritiesbroker-dealersandoversees arbitrationofinvestor(cid:18)broker-dealerdisputes.21FINRAarbitrationawards arepubliclyavailableandsearchableinFINRA(cid:182)sdatabase.22FINRAalso releasesreportsandstatisticsonthenumberofarbitrationsfiled,howcases aredecided,thetypesofdisputesthatarebroughtinarbitration,anddata onmediation.23

Other

federaleffortstopromotedatadisclosurehavebeenless successful.Nearlytenyearsago, theConsumerFinancialProtection Bureau(CFPB)attemptedtorequirefinancialservicescompaniesthathave mandatoryarbitrationclausestodiscloseinformationaboutthearbitrations inwhichtheyparticipate.24TheCFPB(cid:182)sproposedrulewouldhave requiredcoveredpartiestoprovidetheagencywiththeinitialarbitration claim,theanswerorcounterclaim,anyawardordecisionbythearbitrator, certainspecifiedcorrespondencefromthearbitrator,andacopyofthe arbitrationclause,whichtheagencywouldthencollect, redactas appropriate,anddisseminatetothepublicinsearchableformat.25Therule, however,neverwentintoeffect.Itwasincludedwithinarulemakingthat alsoproposedtoprohibitclassactionwaiversinarbitrationclauses.26The classactionwaiverprovedenormouslycontroversial,andCongress blockedtheentirerule.27 theinternational

level,arbitrationprovidersvoluntarilydisclose varioustypesofinformation,thoughthetypeofdataprovideddiffers acrossforums.28 Someinstitutionsprovidesummariesofselected decisions,othersprovideredacteddecisions,andothersprovidethefull decision.29Thedegreeandextentofpublicationalsodependsinpartonthe parties(cid:182)consent.Someprovidersrequireconsenttopublishdecisions, otherswillpublishunlessapartyaffirmativelywithholdsconsent,and otherswillpublishinredactedformintheabsenceofpartyconsent.30 In short,thereisnostandardpracticeattheinternationallevel.Although thereisnostandardpractice,thefactthatdecisionsaremadepublic,even

inpart,differsfromthedomesticcontext,wherethetextofthearbitrator(cid:182)s decision,withtheexceptionofFINRA,ordinarilyiskeptprivate.31

Althoughstatelawsandevolvingpracticesfromarbitrationproviders haveincreasedtheamountofinformationavailabletolawyersandparties, accesstodataisfarfromperfect.Thissectiondiscussestwoseparate problemsrelatedtoarbitrationdata.First,evenwherestatelawsrequire arbitrationproviderstodisclosedata,thedataprovidedisincompletein manyways.Someprovidersdisclosedata,buttheirdisclosurescontain significantgapsorareissuedinaformatthatmakesthedatahardtoutili(cid:93)e. Otherproviderssimplydonotfollowthelawatall,andfacelittlerecourse fornoncompliance.32Second,thecurrentframeworkofdatadisclosure createsasignificantriskofinequalityinaccesstoarbitration-related information.Becausethereisnopublicbodyoragency(outsideof FINRA)thatcollectsanddisseminatesinformation,privatecompaniesfill inthegapwithpaidsubscriptionservicesandtheirowndatacollection measures.Wealthyparties,firms,andrepeatplayerscanaffordtopayfor thatinformation,whileone-timeplayersandlesswealthypartiescannot.

A.LimitationsofAvailableData

Althoughstatelawshaveresultedindisclosureofsomeinformation aboutarbitration,significantgapsstillexist.First,whilestatelawrequires arbitrationproviderstodisclosedata,thatdoesnotmeantheproviders actuallydoso. TenyearsafterCaliforniapasseditslawrequiring arbitrationproviderstodisclosedata,ananalysisbytheCaliforniaState Assemblyconcludedthat(cid:179)manyarbitrationcompaniesfailtoreportany datawhatsoever,andeventhosethatreportsomeinformationdonot complyfully.(cid:180)33Morespecifically,halfofthearbitrationproviderssub(cid:77)ect tothelawdidnotreportanythingatall.34Ofthosethatdidpartially comply,manyfailedtoprovidefullinformationregardingtheamountof theclaim,theprevailingparty,theamountawarded(ifany),howoftenthe

businesspartyhaspreviouslyusedthearbitrationprovider,or employee(cid:182)ssalaryrangeinemploymentdisputes.35

the

Regulatoryagenciesalsohavefoundthatthelackofavailabledata makesithardtostudyarbitration,evenaccountingforstatelawsrequiring datadisclosure.WhentheCFPBconductedanarbitrationstudyinadvance ofitsproposedrule,itcouldnotobtaintheinformationitneededfrom publiclyavailablesources.Rather,ithadtoreachanagreementwithAAA toaccessnon-publiccaseinformationandnotedthatsuchdataisnormally unavailabletoresearchersordisclosedundercurrentlaw.36TheSecurities andExchangeCommission(SEC) facedasimilarproblemwhenit attemptedtostudymandatoryarbitrationagreementsusedbyinvestment advisors,whoareregulatedseparatelyfrombroker-dealers.37Theagency concludedthatbecauseof(cid:179)thelackofpubliclyavailableinformationabout SEC-registeredadviserarbitration,(cid:180)itcould(cid:179)neitherdeterminethe frequencyofadviserarbitrationnorthefrequencyofunpaidadviser awards,(cid:180)andalsocouldnotgathersufficientdata(cid:179)todeterminetheeffects ofmandatoryarbitrationclauses.(cid:180)38

Researchershaveexpressedsimilarconcerns.Evenwhenarbitration providersdisclosedata,theinformationmaycontainerrors,beincomplete, orotherwisebedifficult toconcernsabout arbitratordiversity,whichhasemergedasanimportantissueinrecent yearsandonethatscholarshaveattemptedtostudy,40somehaveconcluded that(cid:179)empiricalworkondiversityinarbitrationwillbeseverelyhindered unlessmoreandbetterdataareavailabletoresearchers.(cid:180)41

toparse.39Withrespect

intimeandarenoteasilyamended.Thus,

Finally,statestatutes,nomatterhowwell-intentioned,arelikelytobe incomplete.Legislatingisaninherentlyslowprocess.Statutesarepassed the atafixedmoment informationthatseemsmostrelevantatthetimeofenactmentmaydiffer fromtheinformationthatpartiesdesirefive,ten,ortwentyyearslater.For example,arbitrationdiscoveryisnotcoveredundercurrentstatedisclosure laws.Thisgapisunfortunate,asthedegreeofdiscoverypermittedin arbitrationissomethingthatpartiesmaycareabout,sinceitaffectsboththe abilitytobuildone(cid:182)scase,aswellastheoverallcostandlengthofthe proceeding. informationonthe amountofdiscoverypermittedshouldbeapartofstatedisclosure statutes.42

Someorgani(cid:93)ationsrecommendthat

Inthesamevein,statelawsdonotrequiredatadisclosureonwhetherthe partieswererequiredtogothroughmediationpriortoarbitrationorabout theoutcomesandtimelinesforthosemediations.(cid:52)uestionsrelatedtoprearbitrationmediationmaynothavebeenimportantwhenstatearbitration disclosurelawswerefirstenacted,buttheyhavebecomemuchmore salientinrecentyears.Manyarbitrationclausesnowrequirethepartiesto engageinmandatorypre-arbitrationmediationbeforeanyarbitrationcan befiled.43Furthermore,ifacompanyinarbitrationpreviouslyhashired thearbitratortoconductmediations, informationisrelevantfor assessingpotentialconflictsofinterest.44Butbecausethisinformationwas notseenasimportantatanearlierpointintime,itismissingfromcurrent statelawrequirements.

that

Similarly,onlinedisputeresolutionhasbecomesignificantlymore prominentsinceCaliforniaadopteditsdisclosurelawin2003,andthereis somedebateaboutwhethersomepartiesfarebetterorworseinremote

arbitrationversusin-personarbitration.45(cid:60)et,statisticsontheoutcomesof in-personarbitrationversusremotearbitrationarenotcoveredbystatelaw. Now,someprovidersaremovingtowardartificialintelligencearbitrators ratherthanhumanarbitrators,somethingthatexistedmerelyintherealmof sciencefictiononlyafewyearsago.46Legislativebodiesareill-suitedto adaptquicklytoaddresschangesininformationtechnologyorrespond whenarbitrationstakeholdersdeterminethatnewcategoriesofinformation aremorerelevantthantheywerepreviously.

B.InequityinDataAccess

Thelackofanyfederalstandard,alongwithgapsandomissionsin publiclyavailabledata,haveusheredinasystemofinequality.47Onthe onehand,greateraccesstodataonarbitrationoutcomesandprocesses offersthehopeofgreatertransparencyforall.48Inreality,however,datais morereadilyavailabletosomethantoothers.Namely,well-heeledrepeat playerswhocanaffordtopayfordatacanaccessit,whileothersareleftin thedark.49Thisdiscrepancyislikelytoexpand,asprivatecompanies developnewsubscription-basedAIandpredictiveanalytictoolsthat analy(cid:93)einformationfromarbitrationsandmakeitavailabletotheirpaid subscribers.

Currently,avarietyofprivateprovidersofferaccesstoarbitration decisionsandothercompiledinformation.Theseservicesarenotfree. Peopleseekingaccessmustpayafeeorsignupforapaidsubscription service.50Somearbitrationstakeholders,particularlylargefirmsandrepeat

players,arebetterabletoaffordthosefeesthanothers.51 (cid:179)Smaller practicesmaynotbeabletoaffordtheoftenhighsubscriptionratesofthe publicationsofarbitrationinstitutions,whichwouldtendtocounterbalance thegreateropennessthatpublicationwouldotherwisebring.(cid:180)52

theproceeding,

thelikelylengthof

Withtheriseofpredictiveanalyticsandartificialintelligencetools, arbitration-relateddataisbecomingevenmorevaluable.53AIandother toolscanenablepartiestomoreaccuratelyassessthelikelihoodofsuccess withparticulararbitrators, the anticipatedcostoftheproceeding,informationaboutopposingcounsel,and thelikelyrangeofanyawardissued,amongotherthings.54Whilesuch toolshavethepotentialtobroadenaccessiftheyaremadefreelyavailable, puttinginformationaccessbehindapaywall(cid:179)willhavetheoppositeeffect ofmakingtheplayingfieldevenlesslevel.(cid:180)55Butthatappearstobe exactlywhatishappening.Severalprivatecompanieshave(cid:77)umpedinto thearbitrationspacetoofferfee-basedAIandpredictiveanalyticprograms forarbitration.TheseincludecompanieslikeArbitratorIntelligence, DisputeResolutionData,and(cid:45)usMundi.56Legaldatabasecompanieslike Lexis,Westlaw,andWolters(cid:46)luwerofferAI toolsandpredictive arbitrationtoolsforafee.57

Inshort,thereisagrowingthirstfordataaboutarbitration.Currentrules andpracticesondatadisclosurehaveprovidedvaluableinformationbut alsohaveleftgaps.Inturn,thosewiththemostinformationarethosewho havethegreatestabilitytopayforit,creatingdisparateaccessthatgives somepartiesagreateradvantageinthearbitrationprocessthanothers.

(cid:42)iventhedisparitiesindataaccess,thelackofcompliancewithother datadisclosurelaws,andtheever-changingnatureofrelevantinformation, Congressshouldenactlegislationtoenablecollectinganddistributingas muchinformationaboutarbitrationaspracticable,inawaythatmakes arbitrationdatabroadlyavailabletoallstakeholders.Morespecifically, CongressshouldamendtheFAAtoaddaprovision(cid:178)onethatcanuse statedisclosurelawsasastartingpoint(cid:178)requiringarbitrationproviders andcompaniesusingarbitrationclausestosubmit informationabout arbitrationprocessesandoutcomes.

Althoughlegislativechangeisnevereasy,thisshouldbethetypeof provisionthatcanattractbroadsupport.Nomatterhowonefeelsaboutthe meritsofarbitrationversuslitigation,andnomatterwhichsideofan arbitrationonemightbeon,thereisbroadagreementthatmorearbitration datashouldbeavailable.Forexample,themembersoftheAmericanBar Association(ABA)SectiononDisputeResolutionhavelongdisagreed about(cid:179)whethertosupportoroppose(cid:180)mandatoryarbitrationprovisions.58 (cid:60)et,sectionmembersonallsidesofthedebatecametogethertosupport theCFPB(cid:182)snow-defunctrulemandatingdatareportingonarbitrationinthe consumerfinancialservicessector.59Partieswantdatasothattheycan makemoreinformeddecisions.Researcherswantdatatobetterstudythe arbitrationprocess.Disclosureisalreadyrequiredbystatelaw,andthus,it wouldnotbeabiglifttoimposesimilarrequirementsatafederallevel.

AmendingtheFAAtorequiredisclosureofarbitrationinformation offersseveralbenefits.First,itwouldincreasetheamountofdatacollected andmakethatdatabroadlyavailable.Sincedatawouldbesubmittedtoa federalagencythatwouldinturnmakethatinformationpubliclyavailable withoutcharge,thelawwouldhelpleveltheplayingfieldandcorrect

existinginequalitiesinaccesstoarbitration-relatedinformation.Itcanalso buildinflexibilitybyallowinganagencytoaddnewcategoriesofrequired informationovertimeascircumstanceschange.Second,itwouldcreatea nationalstandardapplicablethroughoutthecountryandtoallsectorsofthe economy.Thiswouldbepreferabletothecurrentsystem,whereeach agency,state,orarbitrationprovidermustactonitsownandinpiecemeal fashion.Anationalstandardwouldcomplementthedifferentstatelawson arbitrationdisclosureandmakeclearthatdisclosureisrequiredacrossthe countryandnot(cid:77)ustinthehandfulofstatesthathaverequiredit.The federalstatuteshouldoperateasafloorratherthanaceiling.Nothingin thestatutewouldoverrideexistingstaterequirementsorwaterthemdown. Stateswouldremainfreetoenactadditionaldisclosurerequirementsthat extendbeyondthefederalstandard.Third,theimprimaturofthefederal government,alongwithmeaningfulenforcementprovisions,couldinduce compliancefromcoveredpartieswhopreviouslyfailedtocomplywith statedisclosurelaws.60

Thisarbitration-disclosurestatuteshouldincludefivecomponents: it should(1)identifytheinformationtobereportedanddisseminatedaswell aswhoisrequiredtoreportit(cid:30)(2)requirereportingnot(cid:77)ustbyarbitration providersbutalsobyarbitrationparties,withsomeexceptionstoprotect againstundueburdensonpartieswhorarelyparticipateinthearbitration process(cid:30)(3)disclosethecollectedinformationtothepublic,availableatno charge,andmaketheinformationavailableinasearchableanduserfriendlyformat(cid:30)(4)containameaningfulenforcementmechanism(cid:30)and(5) giveafederalagencytheauthoritytooverseetheprocessofcollectingand distributinginformation,aswellastheauthoritytoad(cid:77)usttheinformation requiredtobedisclosed,asvariouscategoriesarelikelytobecomemoreor lessrelevantovertime.Eachcomponentisdiscussedbelow.

A.TheStatuteShouldIdentifytheInformationtobeDisclosed

First,

theamendmentshouldlist

thecategoriesofinformationthat arbitrationadministratorsandotherswouldhavetoprovide.State-level disclosurelaws,suchasthoseenactedbyCalifornia,New(cid:45)ersey,Maine, Maryland,andtheDistrictofColumbia,offeragoodstartingpoint.As explainedabove, required disclosures,includingthenamesoftheattorneysinvolved,thelengthofthe proceeding,identifyingtheprevailingparty,and,ifapplicable,thesi(cid:93)eof

thosestatutesalreadylistcategoriesof

identifyingtherelief

theaward, initiallysoughtbytheplaintiff, demographicinformationabouttherosterofarbitrators,whethereither partyisarepeatplayer,andotherinformation.61

theirabilitytobuildacaseandabout

Inadditiontothosecategories,thestatuteshouldalsoencompassother categoriesofrelevantinformation.(cid:42)iventhatpartiesareconcernedboth about thelengthandcostof proceedings,thestatuteshouldrequiredisclosureoftheamountandtypes ofdiscoveryproceedingsallowedinthearbitration.62Thiswouldallow partiestoanaly(cid:93)ewhetherthereisanycorrelationbetweentheextentof discoveryandthelengthorcostofaproceeding. Italsowouldallow partiestoassesswhetherplaintiffswhoreceivelessdiscoveryareless likelytoprevail,aswellaswhetherplaintiffswhoreceivemorediscovery aremorelikelytoprevail.63

Thestatuteshouldalsorequiredisclosureofwhetheranarbitrationwasa paper-onlyarbitration(nohearing),aremoteoronlinearbitration,oraninpersonarbitration.Thiscouldhelppartiesassesswhetherthearbitration formatinfluencestheoutcome,length,orcostoftheproceeding.The statutealsoshouldrequiredisclosureofinformationonanycontractually includingtheoutcomeofanysuch requiredpre-arbitrationmediation, mediation.Thisinformationhasbecomemoreimportantinrecentyears,as ahighpercentageofcompaniesarenowrequiringpartiestoundergo mandatorymediationasapreconditiontoseekingarbitration.64Such provisionsoffertheprospectofasimpleandfastresolution,buttheyalso createanadditionalbarrierforplaintiffs,whomayfindthemselvesunable topursuearbitrationiftheymistakenlyfail tofulfillpre-arbitration requirements.65Requiringdataonthenumberandoutcomeofpre-

arbitrationmediationswouldhelpdetermineifpre-arbitrationactually works,aswellasifitpreventspartiesfromaccessingthearbitralforum.

Finally,

thestatuteshouldrequiredisclosureofwrittenarbitration decisions,albeitwithlimitedredactionstoprotecttheprivacyoftheparties andconfidentialinformation.66Requiringdisclosureofwrittendecisions shouldnotbeascontroversialasitmayseematfirstblush.First,other scholarspreviouslyhaveurgedCongressnot(cid:77)usttorequiredisclosureof writtendecisionsbuttorequirearbitratorstoissuewrittendecisions,at leastincertaincategoriesofcases.67Theproposalheredoesnotimpose anynewrequirementsonarbitratorstoissuedecisions.Itmerelyrequires thatanywrittendecisionsbemadeavailable.Second,disclosureofwritten decisionsisnotnew.FINRAalreadyrequiresdisclosureofdecisions,the CFPBwouldhavepublishedarbitrationdecisions(withappropriate redactions)underitsproposedrule,68andseveralinternationalarbitration providersvoluntarilydiscloseselectdecisions.69Privatecompaniescollect arbitrationdecisionsandprovidethemtosubscribersforafee.70This statutewouldmerelyformali(cid:93)ethesepracticesandmergethemintoa singlestandard.

Moreover,writtendecisionscanproduceusefulinformation.Predictive analytictoolscananaly(cid:93)epriordecisionstomakepredictionsaboutfuture cases.ProfessorsCharlotteAlexanderandNicoleIannaronefoundthat analy(cid:93)ingwrittenFINRAdecisionscanhelpdeterminethefrequencyof claimantvictory,claimantloss,andsettlement.71Tobesure,partyprivacy shouldbetakenintoaccount.Congresscouldauthori(cid:93)etheagency administeringthisstatutetoestablishrulesfortheredactionofprivateparty information.Alternatively,CongresscouldimportoradapttheFreedomof InformationAct(cid:182)sexemptionsfortradesecretsandotherconfidential

information,72aswellasforanydisclosurethatconstitutesan(cid:179)unwarranted invasionofpersonalprivacy(cid:180)73intoanarbitrationdisclosurestatute.74

B.TheStatuteShouldIdentifyWhohasReportingObligations

Thestatuteshouldapplytobotharbitrationprovidersandarbitration parties,withsomelimitedexceptionswhereareportingrequirementwould imposeundueburdensonsmallplayerswhorarelyengageinthearbitration system.75Placingdisclosurerequirementsonpartieswouldrepresenta departurefromcurrentstatelaws,whichlimitreportingobligationsto arbitrationproviders.76However,requiringreportingbyarbitrationparties inadditiontoarbitrationproviderscouldyieldvaluableinformationthat existinglawsdonotcapture.First,itwouldhelpfillingapsresultingfrom incompleteornon-existentreportingbyprovidersunderstatelaw.(cid:42)iven thatsomearbitrationprovidersfail todiscloserequireddata,placing obligationsonpartiesservesasabackstop,asthepartieswillalsohave Ifarbitrationproviders dataonthearbitrationsinwhichtheytakepart. fullycompliedwiththeir this thenperhaps redundancywouldbeunnecessary.Butthatcurrentlyisnotthecase.

reportingobligations,

Second,reportingatthepartylevelmightshedinsightsthataremore difficulttodiscernfromprovider-leveldata.Forexample,ifapartyreports howmanytimesthatpartyappearedbeforeaparticulararbitrationprovider eachyear,thatinformationmayproveusefulinassessingtheriskofrepeatplayerbias.77

Third,arbitrationpartieshaveinformationthatarbitrationprovidersdo nothave. Inparticular,arbitrationproviderslikelywillnothave informationaboutmandatorypre-arbitrationmediation,particularlyfor Ifoneistryingtoassessthe disputesthatneveradvancetoarbitration.

impactofmandatorypre-arbitrationprocedures,oneneedstoknowthe numberofdisputesinwhichpre-arbitrationmediationoccurred,whether thoseresultsweresuccessful,andthenumberofarbitrationsthatensued. Thiswouldhelpdeterminewhetherpre-arbitrationresultsinsuccessful outcomes,orifitservesasabarriertoseekingarbitrationwheremediation doesnotresolvethedispute. Itwouldalsoallowpartiestocompare mediationoutcomestoarbitrationoutcomesinaddressingwhetherto acceptamediatedsettlementofferorgoforwardwitharbitration.But becausethatinformationconcernsconductoutsideofformalarbitration,it wouldonlybeinthehandsofparties,notarbitrationproviders.

Toavoidariskofimposingundueburdensonpartiesthatrarelyappear inarbitration,thestatutecouldplacesomelimitsonanarbitrationparty(cid:182)s dutytoreport.Forexample,forpartiesthatincludearbitrationclausesin theirstandard-formcontractsorcontractsofadhesion,thestatutecould limitthereportingrequirementtothedraftingpartyandcouldexemptthe non-draftingparty.Forarbitrationagreementsthatarefreelynegotiated, thestatutecouldlimitreportingobligationsonlytopartiesthatengagedin fiveormorearbitrationsormandatorypre-arbitrationprocessesinany givenyear,ortensuchproceedingsoveraperiodofthreeyears.This ensuresthatpartieswithonlyasinglecaseoraverysmallhandfulof disputeswouldnothavetoundergotheburdensofreporting.Thatsaid, requiringpartiestoreportdataaboutcategorieslikethesi(cid:93)eoftheclaim, lengthofproceeding,andtheawardshouldnotbeonerous,asthatisall dataintheparty(cid:182)spossessioninthefirstplace.

C.TheInformationDisclosedUndertheStatuteShouldbePublicly AvailableatNoCharge

Onereasontoenactafederalarbitrationdisclosurestatuteistolevelthe playingfieldandaddressinequitiesresultingfromasystemwhere informationisavailableprimarilytothoseentitieswillingandabletopay forit.Addressingthatconcernrequiresmakingthecollectedinformation availabletoeveryoneandeliminatingfinancialbarrierstoaccess.(cid:45)ustas several lawshouldensurethat informationwillbepubliclyavailableatnocharge,orforasetcostfor thaninelectronicformat.78 informationprovidedinwritingrather Moreover,becausetheinformationwillbecollectedbythefederalagency responsibleforadministeringthestatute,theagencycanbetheonetomake

stateshavemandated,

thefederal

theinformationavailable,asFINRAdoesfortheinformationthat it collects.79Asaresult,individualcompaniesorotherarbitrationparties withreportingobligationsdonothavetoworryaboutsettingupawebsite orsomeotherdigitalspacetomakeitsarbitrationinformationpublicly available.Partieswouldonlyneedtosendtheirinformationtothefederal agency,whichinturnwouldcollectthatinformationandmakeitavailable inasearchableanduser-friendlyformat.

D.TheStatuteShouldContainMeaningfulEnforcementMechanisms

Anystatuterequiringdatadisclosurewillonlybeeffectiveifcovered partiesprovidethedatathatthestatuterequires.(cid:42)iventhatnoncompliance hasbeenaproblemwithrespecttoCalifornia(cid:182)sarbitrationdisclosurelaw,a federalstatutemustbuildinmeaningfulmeasurestoensurecompliance. First,thestatuteshouldprovidebothaprivaterightofactionandapublic rightofaction.Forexample,bothMarylandandtheDistrictofColumbia allowprivatepartiestobringanactionen(cid:77)oininganypartyfromviolating thedisclosurestatuteandprovidingforreasonableattorneys(cid:182)fees.80Other states,bycontrast,permitonlypublicenforcement,whichmayexplainwhy thesestateshaveexperienceddifficultyensuringcompliance.81Public enforcementbythefederalgovernmentmayalsohelpinducecompliance fromprovidersandparties.

Second,whileremedieslikein(cid:77)unctivereliefandpaymentofattorneys(cid:182) feesmaybesufficienttodeterinadvertentomissionsorviolationsthat occurredingoodfaith,thestatutecouldincludeotherpenaltieswherethe violatorwasnegligentordidnotactingoodfaith.Amongotherremedies, thestatutecouldprovidethatanynoncompliantarbitrationproviderwillbe deemed(cid:179)unavailable,(cid:180)toarbitrateundersection5oftheFAA.82Pursuant tosection5,afederalcourtwouldhaveauthoritytotransferthedisputeto incertaincases,declarethearbitrationclause anotherprovider,or, unenforceable.83 Theriskthataprovidercouldlosethechanceto

administerasetofarbitrations,andlosetherevenuethatcomeswithit, couldprovideastrongincentivetocomplywiththestatute.

Iftheviolatorisanarbitrationpartyratherthanaprovider,thestatute couldimposeadditionalremediesforviolationsthatwerenegligentornot ingoodfaith.Forsuchviolations,thestatutecouldmakenoncompliancea basisforinvalidatingthearbitrationclause.Inotherwords,ifapartyseeks tocompelarbitrationofadisputebutisinviolationofthedisclosure statute,theopposingpartycouldraisethatnoncomplianceasadefenseand havethearbitrationclausedeclaredunenforceable,ortheviolationcould provideabasisforacourtrefusingtoenforceanarbitrationaward.(cid:42)iven theimpactofthisremedy,itmaybeworthconsideringwhetherthere shouldbeasafeharborforentitiesthatcanshowthattheywerenot negligentorthattheymadeinadvertenterrors.Thisremedywouldgo slightlyfurtherthanstatelawremedieslikethoseinMaryland,which providethatnoncompliancemaybeconsideredasafactorinaddressing whether otherwise unenforceable,butthatit(cid:179)maynotbethesolereasontorefusetoenforce anaward.(cid:180)84Partiesworriedaboutlosingtheabilitytocompelarbitration orconfirmanarbitrationawardwouldhaveastrongincentivetocomply withthelaw.

unconscionable

arbitration

clause

the

Theseenforcementoptionsaremerelyexamples.Theyarenottheonly possibleenforcementoptions.Theimportantpointisthatunlessthestatute containsmeaningfulenforcementmeasures,itrunstheriskofrunninginto thesamecomplianceproblemsthatCaliforniaexperiencedwhentryingto holdarbitrationprovidersaccountableunderitsstatute.

E.CongressShouldGrantaFederalAgencyAuthoritytoAdministerthe Statute

Finally,Congressshouldappointafederalagencytoadministerthe statuteandgranttheagencybothenforcementandrulemakingauthority.It couldeitherbringthisstatutewithintheauthorityofanexistingfederal agencyorestablishanewagencytoadministerthestatute.Mostofthe FAAgoverns agreements processes(cid:178)making enforceableincourtsandlayingouttheprocessforcourtstocompel arbitration,staylitigation,andconfirmorvacatearbitrationawards(cid:178)and doesnotrequirefederalagencyinvolvement.Adatadisclosurestatute,

arbitration

(cid:77)udicial

however,doesnotinvolvelitigationproceduresbutinsteadthecollection anddistributionofinformation.Withrespecttothisstatutoryamendment, agencyoversightiscritical,forseveralreasons.

task.

First,someentityneedstoberesponsibleforreceivingtheinformation, puttingitintoasearchableformat,anddistributingit.Agenciesarewellsuitedtothat FINRAcurrentlyoverseesthisprocessofdata collectionanddistributioninthesecuritiesarbitrationcontext.85Similarly, iftheCFPB(cid:182)sarbitrationrulehadgoneintoeffect,theagencywouldhave beenresponsibleforcollectingtheinformationrequiredbytheruleand thenprovidingittothepubliconitswebsite.86Inthelitigationcontext,the AdministrativeOfficeoftheU.S.Courtscollectsanddistributesstatistics andreportsonfederallitigationtrends,statisticsthatarefrequentlystudied andcited.87Creatingananalogousagencyforarbitrationstatisticscouldbe similarlybeneficial.

Second,placinganagencyinchargeofcollectinganddisseminating informationalsomakesiteasierforarbitrationpartiestocomplywiththe law.Whileitmaynotbedifficultforarbitrationpartiestocollectdataon theirarbitrationsandsubmitthemtoanagency,itwouldbeburdensometo requireeverypartytoanarbitrationtopubliclypostdataaboutitsown arbitrationproceedings.Puttingtheagencyinchargerelievesarbitration partiesfromthisobligation.

Third,afederalagencycouldhelpensurethatpartiescomplywiththe statute.Anagencywithcongressionally-grantedenforcementpowerwould beabletomonitorcoveredparties,notifyanypartiesthatareoutof complianceand,ifnecessary,bringenforcementproceedingstoensure compliance.Thisalsowouldbeconsistentwithseveralstatelawsthat authori(cid:93)epublicenforcementinadditiontoprivateenforcement.88

Fourth,Congressshoulddelegateauthorityfortheagencytoissuerules addingothercategoriesofinformationwhentheagencyfindsthatitwould beinthepublicinteresttodoso.Asthenatureofdisputeresolution changesovertime(cid:178)whetherduetoariseinremoteandonlinearbitration,

ariseinmandatorypre-arbitration,newphenomenalikemassarbitration,89 orsomeyet-to-be-anticipateddevelopment(cid:178)thetypeofinformationthat partieswillwantandthatwillbecomemostrelevantinevitablywillchange overtime.Abodyasslow-actingasCongressisunlikelytokeepupwith thosechanges.90Anagency,evenonethathastogothroughthenoticeand-commentrulemakingprocess,canactmorenimblytoaddresssuch Inaddition,Congresscouldalsoauthori(cid:93)ethe changesastheyarise. agencytomakerulesinvolvingotheraspectsofthestatute,suchas authori(cid:93)ingtheagencytomakeredactionstoarbitrationdecisionspriorto publication,inordertoprotectpartyprivacy.91(cid:42)iventhatvirtuallyevery stakeholderinthearbitrationprocessdesirestransparencyandaccessto information,92suchrulemakingsandrelatedagencyactionshopefully shouldnotengendersignificantcontroversy.

Inthefieldofdisputeresolution,dataisking.Aspredictiveanalytics andAI toolsbecomemoreprevalent,everyoneinvolvedindispute resolutionwantsmoredatatoguidethemastheyprepareforfuturecases. Whiledatahaslongbeenavailableinpublicdisputeresolutionforumslike (cid:77)udicialsystems,nocomprehensivestructurefordatacollectionand distributionexistsforprivatearbitration.Thecurrentpatchworkapproach ofstatelaws,agencyregulations,andvoluntarydisclosuresbyarbitration providershaveyieldedsomeinformation,butalsohaveleftsignificantgaps andfosteredaprivatemarketplacethatoffersdatatothosewhocanafford topayforitwhileleavingeveryoneelseatadisadvantage.Toaddress theseconcerns,CongressshouldamendtheFAAtorequirearbitration providersandpartiestodisclosedataonarbitrationcasesandoutcomesto thefederalgovernment,whichinturnwillcollectandmakethat

informationpubliclyavailable.Whilethereisnoshortageofdisagreement aboutarbitrationingeneral, the benefitsofhavingdataaboutarbitration.Afederallawondatadisclosure wouldfosteropenness,promotetransparency,andbenefitarbitration providers,arbitrationparties,andresearchersalike.

thereiswidespreadagreementabout

--- FOOTNOTES ---

Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Commercial Law Commons, Dispute Resolution

and Arbitration Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons

Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Commercial Law Commons, Dispute Resolution

and Arbitration Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons

RICHARDFRAN(cid:46)EL(cid:13)

I.INTRODUCTION

(cid:13)ProfessorofLaw,DrexelUniversityThomasR.(cid:46)lineSchoolofLaw.

1.Seeinfranotes13(cid:177)14andaccompanyingtext.

2.Seeinfranote57andaccompanyingtext. 3.See,e.g.,CharlotteS.Alexander(cid:9)Nicole(cid:42).Iannarone,Winning,Defined?

Text-MiningArbitrationDecisions,42CARDO(cid:61)OL.REV.1695,1700(cid:177)01(2021).

4.See9U.S.C.(cid:134)(cid:134)1(cid:177)16. 5.CAL.CIV.PROC.CODE(cid:134)1281.96(Deering2024)(cid:30)ME.REV.STAT.tit.10, (cid:134)1394(2024)(cid:30)D.C.CODE(cid:134)16-4430(2024)(cid:30)MD.CODEANN.,COM.LAW(cid:134)14-3903(c) (LexisNexis2024)(cid:30)N.(cid:45).STAT.ANN.(cid:134)2A:23B-36(LexisNexis2024).

6.Seeinfranotes54(cid:177)56andaccompanyingtext. 7.SeeN.(cid:60).CIT(cid:60)BARASS(cid:182)NCOMM(cid:182)N.INT(cid:182)LCOM.DISP.,PUBLICATIONOF (cid:62)hereinafter

INTERNATIONALARBITRATIONAWARDSANDDECISIONS PUBLICATIONOFINTERNATIONALARBITRATIONAWARDS(cid:64).

(2014)

8.ThisisnotthefirstcallforCongresstoamendtheFAAtorequirearbitration usersandproviderstodisclosearbitrationdata. See,e.g.,RamonaL.Lampley, “Underdog”Arbitration:APlanforTransparency,90WASH.L.REV.1727,1734 (2015).

9.CAL.CIV.PROC.CODE(cid:134)1281.96(2003).

10.SeeLampley,supranote8,at1764.SeegenerallyDavidHorton,Remote

ForcedArbitration,108CORNELLL.REV.137(2022).

II.THEPATCHWOR(cid:46)LANDSCAPEOFARBITRATIONDATACOLLECTION ANDDISCLOSURE

11.TracyM.Cohenetal.,UtilizingAI-PoweredToolsinArbitration,ADRIC (May23,2024),https:(cid:18)(cid:18)adric.ca(cid:18)utili(cid:93)ing-ai-powered-tools-in-arbitration(cid:18) cid:179)Because commercialarbitrationsaretypicallyprivateandconfidential,theavailabledatais morelimitedthaninlitigation.(cid:180 (cid:30)(cid:45)efferyCommission(cid:9)(cid:42)iuliaPreviti,TheIncreasing UseofDataAnalyticsinInternationalArbitration,N.(cid:60).L.(cid:45).(Nov.20,2020,2:30PM), https:(cid:18)(cid:18)www.law.com(cid:18)newyorklaw(cid:77)ournal(cid:18)2020(cid:18)11(cid:18)20(cid:18)the-increasing-use-of-dataanalytics-in-international-arbitration(cid:18) (notingthat(cid:179)informationaboutarbitration proceedingshastraditionallybeenscarce...(cid:180 (cid:30)AndreaCannChandrasekher(cid:9)David Horton,ArbitrationNation:DatafromFourProviders,107CAL.L.REV.1,18(2019) (notingthatempiricalscholarshiponarbitration(cid:179)whilevaluable,isalsolimited(cid:180 (cid:30) Lampley,supranote8,at1730(cid:177)34(discussingthe(cid:179)significantlimitations(cid:180)ofexisting dataonarbitration)(cid:30)CommentLetteronProposedRuleofArbitrationAgreements fromNancyA.Welsh,A.B.A.SectionofDisputeResolution,toCFPB cid:45)uly29,2016), https:(cid:18)(cid:18)www.regulations.gov(cid:18)document(cid:34)D(cid:32)CFPB-2016-0020-5905 the prevalenceofmandatorypre-disputeconsumerarbitrationclauses,thepublicgenerally haslittleinformationregardingtheuseoftheprocessoritsoutcomes.(cid:180 (cid:30)(cid:46)EVIN(cid:42). BA(cid:46)ER,CAL.STATEASSEMB.COMM.ONTHE(cid:45)UDICIAR(cid:60),MANDATOR(cid:60)CONSUMER ARBITRATION:HASCOMPLIANCEWITHCALIFORNIA(cid:182)S LANDMAR(cid:46)DATA TRANSPARENC(cid:60)LAWBEENSUFFICIENTTOACCOMPLISHTHELE(cid:42)ISLATURE(cid:182)S(cid:42)OALS(cid:34)5 (2013) cid:179)Manyleadingresearchersonbothsidesofthe(cid:62)arbitration(cid:64)issuehave commentedthattherearefewavailabledatasources,andthosethatexisthavebeen difficultandtimeconsumingtoobtain.(cid:180 (cid:30)PeterB.Rutledge,WhoCanBeAgainst Fairness?TheCaseAgainsttheArbitrationFairnessAct,9CARDO(cid:61)O(cid:45).CONFLICT RESOL.267,281(2008)(emphasi(cid:93)ing(cid:179)theneedformorethoroughempiricalresearch intothedynamicsofarbitrationspecificallyandtheresolutionofdisputesmore generally(cid:180 . cid:179)(cid:62)D(cid:64)espite

12.CynthiaEstlund,TheBlackHoleofMandatoryArbitration,96N.C.L.REV.

679,700(2018).

13.See(cid:42)enieHarrison,ArbitrationisFailingCaliforniaEmployees,L.A.(cid:9)S.F. cid:45)une6,2019),https:(cid:18)(cid:18)genieharrisonlaw.com(cid:18)wp-content(cid:18)uploads(cid:18)2019(cid:18) DAIL(cid:60)(cid:45). about 06(cid:18)arbitration-is-failing-california-employees.pdf arbitrationoutcomesiscritical.Withoutthisinformation,thereisnowaytoidentify repeatplayers,connect thedots,andusemarketforcestopushtowardfairer outcomes.(cid:180 . cid:179)(cid:62)H(cid:64)aving

good

data

14.See,e.g.,NancyA.Welsh,DisputeResolutionNeutrals’EthicalObligationto SupportMeasuredTransparency,71O(cid:46)LA.L.REV.823,844(2019) cid:179)(cid:62)T(cid:64)ransparency andaccountabilityofferedbysuchreportingandpublication(cid:62)ofinformationon arbitration(cid:64)havehelpedtopromotetheintegrityofthedisputeresolutionprocess.(cid:180 .

15.SeeCAL.CIV.PROC.CODE(cid:134)1281.96(West2020)(cid:30)ME.REV.STAT.tit.10, (cid:134)1394(2010)(cid:30)D.C.CODE(cid:134)16-4430(2008)(cid:30)MD.CODEANN.,COM.LAW(cid:134)14-3903(c) (LexisNexis2011)(cid:30)N.(cid:45).STAT.ANN.(cid:134)2A:23B-36(West2020).

16.Seesupranote15. 17.CAL.CIV.PROC.CODE(cid:134)1281.96(a).

18.See,e.g.,BA(cid:46)ER,supranote11,at9(describingotherstatedisclosurestatutes

as(cid:179)virtuallyidentical(cid:180)toCalifornia(cid:182)slaw).

19.SeeME.REV.STAT.tit.10,(cid:134)1394 cid:46 (requiringdisclosureofarbitration (requiring provider(cid:182)sfinancial identificationoftheconsumer(cid:182)sattorneyanddescriptionofconsumercasetype)(cid:30)MD. CODEANN.,COM.LAW,(cid:134)14-3903(6)(requiringidentificationoftheconsumer(cid:182)s attorneyanddescriptionofconsumercasetype).

inaparty)(cid:30)D.C.CODE(cid:134)16-4430(5)

interest

20.SeeAAAConsumer

Statistics,AM.ARB.ASS(cid:182)N, andEmployment www.adr.org(cid:18)consumer(lastvisitedAug.16,2024)(cid:30)ConsumerCaseInformation, (cid:45)AMS,https:(cid:18)(cid:18)www.(cid:77)amsadr.com(cid:18)consumercases(lastvisitedSept.10,2024).

21.See,e.g.,WhatitMeanstobeRegulatedbyFINRA,FINRA(Apr.22,2024),

https:(cid:18)(cid:18)www.finra.org(cid:18)investors(cid:18)insights(cid:18)regulated-by-FINRA.

22.12904.Awards,FINRA(Apr.16,2007),https:(cid:18)(cid:18)www.finra.org(cid:18)rulesguidance(cid:18)rulebooks(cid:18)retired-rules(cid:18)12904 publicly cid:179)All available.(cid:180 (cid:30)ArbitrationAwardsOnline,FINRA,https:(cid:18)(cid:18)www.finra.org(cid:18)arbitrationmediation(cid:18)arbitration-awards(lastvisitedSept.6,2024).

bemade

awards

shall

23.DisputeResolution

https:(cid:18)(cid:18)www.finra.org(cid:18)arbitrationmediation(cid:18)dispute-resolution-statistics(lastvisitedSept.6,2024)(cid:30)seealsoWelsh, supranote14,at845(cid:177)46(describingFINRA(cid:182)sdatagatheringanddisclosure processes).

Statistics,FINRA,

24.SeeArbitrationAgreements,81Fed.Reg.32830,32840(proposedMay24,

2016)(codifiedat12C.F.R.pt.1040).

25.SeeArbitrationAgreements,82Fed.Reg.33210,33430 cid:45)uly19,2017)

(codifiedat12C.F.R.pt.1040).

26.Seeid. 27.SeePub.L.No.115(cid:177)74,131Stat.1243(Nov.1,2017)(repealingtheCFPB(cid:182)s arbitrationrule)(cid:30)seealsoArbitrationAgreements,82Fed.Reg.55500,55500(Nov. 22,2017)(codifiedat12C.F.R.1040)(explainingthatCongressrevokedtheCFPB(cid:182)s arbitrationrulepursuanttotheCongressionalReviewActandthattherulehasnoforce oreffect).

28.SeePUBLICATIONOFINTERNATIONALARBITRATIONAWARDS,supranote7,at1 (finding(cid:179)greatdiversity(cid:180)in(cid:179)rulesandpractices(cid:180)ofinternationalarbitrationproviders regardingpublicationofawards).

29.Seeid.at6. 30.Seeid.at8.

III.PROBLEMSWITHACCESSTODATA

31.Variousotherorgani(cid:93)ationsthathandlespeciali(cid:93)eddisputesmayalsorelease informationabouttheirarbitrations.SeeWelsh,supranote14,at847(cid:177)52(describing thepracticesof,interalia,theInternetCorporationforAssignedNamesandNumbers (ICANN),theWorldIntellectualPropertyOrgani(cid:93)ation(WIPO),andorgani(cid:93)edlabor arbitrationsgovernedbycollectivebargainingrules).

32.Seeinfranotes33(cid:177)35andaccompanyingtext. 33.BA(cid:46)ER,supranote11,at1. 34.

Id.at7(cid:177)8.

Id.

35. 36.SeeArbitrationAgreements,81Fed.Reg.32830,32840(proposedMay24, 2016)(codifiedat12C.F.R.pt.1040)(cid:30)seealsoWelsh,supranote14,at835 (describingtheCFPB(cid:182)sprocessofobtainingdataforitsstudy).

37.SEC,OFFICEOFTHEINVESTORADVOCATE,MANDATOR(cid:60)ARBITRATIONAMON(cid:42) SEC-RE(cid:42)ISTEREDINVESTMENTADVISORS4(2023),https:(cid:18)(cid:18)www.sec.gov(cid:18)files(cid:18)2023oiad-ria-mandatory-arbitration-report.pdf.

Id.at3.

38. 39.See,e.g.,(cid:45)udithResniketal.,CollectivePreclusionandInaccessible Arbitration:Data,Disclosure,andPublicKnowledge,24LEWIS(cid:9)CLAR(cid:46)L.REV.611, 654(cid:177)56(2020)(describingattemptstoanaly(cid:93)eAAA(cid:182)sarbitrationdatasetsandthe difficultiestheauthorsencountered).

40.See,e.g.,AndreaCannChandrasekher,AnEmpirical

Investigationof ArbitratorRaceandGenderinU.S.Arbitration,35(cid:60)ALE(cid:45).L.(cid:9)FEMINISM159,174(cid:177) 77(2024)(cid:30)Nicole(cid:42).Iannarone,StructuralBarrierstoInclusioninArbitratorPools, 96WASH.L.REV.1389,1408(cid:177)11(2021).

41.Chandrasekher,supranote40,at204.

42.SeeDAVIDSELI(cid:42)MAN,NAT(cid:182)LCONSUMERL.CTR.,MODELSTATECONSUMER(cid:9)

EMPLO(cid:60)MENT(cid:45)USTICEENFORCEMENTACT51(cid:177)53(2017).

43.See,e.g.,RichardFrankel,FightingMassArbitration:AnEmpiricalStudyof theCorporateResponsetoMassArbitrationanditsImplicationsfortheFederal Arbitration 2025), https:(cid:18)(cid:18)papers.ssrn.com(cid:18)sol3(cid:18)papers.cfm(cid:34)abstract(cid:66)id(cid:32)4705062(surveyingover100 companiesandfindingthatmorethaneightypercentofcompaniessurveyedrequire pre-arbitrationmediation).

(forthcoming

VAND.

REV.

Act,

44.See,e.g.,Harrison,supranote13 cid:179)Ithasbecomestandardpracticefordefense firmstohirearecentlychosenarbitratorinmanyothercases,oftenasamediator, quicklyfunnelinghugesumstothearbitrator.(cid:180 (cid:30)seealsoWelsh,supranote14,at838 (explaininghowtheABASectiononDisputeResolutionhassupportedrequiring arbitratorstodiscloseanypriormediationexperiencethatmightaffect their impartiality).

45.SeeChandrasekher(cid:9)Horton,supranote11,at35n.226. 46.SeeDavidHorton,ForcedRobotArbitration,109CORNELLL.REV.679,680(cid:177)

81(2023).

47.SeeAlexander(cid:45).S.Colvin(cid:9)MarkD.(cid:42)ough,MandatoryEmployment Arbitration,19ANN.REV.L.(cid:9)SOC.SCI.131,132(2023)(statingthatthelackofany nationalagencyoverseeingarbitrationhasresultedinlesspubliclyavailabledata).

48.SeePUBLICATIONOFINTERNATIONALARBITRATIONAWARDS,supranote7,at2 cid:179)Increasedpublicationofarbitraldecisionsmaytendtoleveltheplayingfieldand openthepracticeofinternationalarbitrationtomorelawyers.(cid:180 .

49.See,e.g.,(cid:46)athleenPaisley(cid:9)EdnaSussman,ArtificialIntelligenceChallenges andOpportunitiesforInternationalArbitration,11N.(cid:60).DISP.RESOL.LAW.35,37 (2018) cid:179)Internationalarbitrationrepeat-playershavepreviouslyhaduniqueadvantages inpickingarbitrators,knowingwhatargumentstomake,andpredictingoutcomes.(cid:180 .

50.PUBLICATIONOFINTERNATIONALARBITRATIONAWARDS,supranote7,at2(cid:30) seeWelsh,supranote14,at850(notingthataccesstointernationalcommercial arbitrationinformation(cid:179)isgenerallyavailableonlybysubscription(cid:180 .

51.SeePUBLICATIONOFINTERNATIONALARBITRATIONAWARDS,supranote7,at2 cid:179)(cid:42)reateraccesstothecontentofawardsandthearbitratorsrenderingthemconfers advantagesintheprocess,andthataccesscanbeveryuneven.(cid:180 .

Id.

52. 53.ElliotFriedmanetal.,InternationalArbitrationin2024:GenerativeAI: OpportunitiesandRisksinArbitration,FRESHFIELDS(2024),https:(cid:18)(cid:18)www.fresh fields.us(cid:18)insights(cid:18)campaigns(cid:18)international-arbitration-in-2024(cid:18)generative-aiopportunities-and-risks-in-arbitration(cid:18)(notingthatpartiesarealreadyutili(cid:93)ingAI technologiesforvariousaspectsofarbitrationpractice)(cid:30)LuciaBi(cid:93)ikovaetal.,IAMeets AIRiseof theMachines,DAIL(cid:60)(cid:45)US(Oct.2,2023),https:(cid:18)(cid:18)daily(cid:77)us.com(cid:18)legaltech(cid:18)2023(cid:18)10(cid:18)ia-meets-ai-rise-of-the-machines cid:179)AI-poweredtoolsarealready,and increasingly,usedatvirtuallyallstagesofinternationalarbitrationproceedings,andits potentialfortransformationisalreadyevident.(cid:180 .

54.Seesupranote53(cid:30)Commission(cid:9)Previti,supranote11(cid:30)Paisley(cid:9)Sussman,

supranote49,at36.

55.Paisley(cid:9)Sussman,supranote49,at36. 56.SeeCommission(cid:9)Previti,supranote11(discussingdifferentcompaniesand

theirproducts)(cid:30)Paisley(cid:9)Sussman,supranote49,at38.

57.See,e.g.,LaborArbitratorandAwardsAnalyzer,WOLTERS(cid:46)LUWER,

https:(cid:18)(cid:18)www.wolterskluwer.com(cid:18)en(cid:18)solutions(cid:18)vitallaw-law-firms(cid:18)labor-arbitrator-andawards-analy(cid:93)er https:(cid:18)(cid:18)www.lexisnexis.com(cid:18)en-us(cid:18)products(cid:18)lexis-plusai.page(cid:34)srsltid(cid:32)AfmBOoqrk0(cid:42)k(cid:46)D(cid:45)0Clkyg-(cid:60)w(cid:93)wHk(cid:66)ibteP(cid:59)90Hm6-0ECsRy-

Lexis+AI,

visited

2024)(cid:30)

Sept.

(last

LE(cid:59)ISNE(cid:59)IS,

IV.AMENDIN(cid:42)THEFAATORE(cid:52)UIREDATACOLLECTIONAND DISCLOSURE

(cid:46)(cid:45)P2ETHy(lastvisitedSept.3,2024)(cid:30)WestlawPrecisionwithCoCounsel,THOMSON REUTERS,https:(cid:18)(cid:18)tinyurl.com(cid:18)4m(cid:77)xtm5c(lastvisitedSept.3,2024).

58.SeeWelsh,supranote14,at833(cid:177)34. 59.Seeid.

60.SeeBA(cid:46)ER,supranote11,at5(cid:30)supranotes33(cid:177)35andaccompanyingtext

(discussingwidespreadnoncompliancewithCalifornia(cid:182)sarbitrationdisclosurelaw).

61.Seesupranotes15(cid:177)19andaccompanyingtext(discussingstatelawdisclosure

requirements).

62.SELI(cid:42)MAN,supranote42,at51(cid:177)53(recommendingthatarbitratorsberequired

toreportdataaboutthedegreeofdiscoverypermittedinarbitration).

63.Thesecategoriesarenotmeanttobeexhaustive.Othercategoriesofrelevant informationmightincludegreaterinformationaboutarbitratordemographicstoassess thediversityofarbitratorswhoselectedtoactuallyarbitratethedispute,ascomparedto simplyaddressingthediversityofaprovider(cid:182)slistofeligiblearbitrators.However,it maybeimportant toconsiderappropriatemeasurestosafeguardanyindividual arbitrator(cid:182)sprivatepersonalinformation.Foramoredetaileddiscussionofarbitrator diversity,seesupranote40.

64.See,e.g.,Frankel,supranote43,at20(surveying106companiesandfinding thatmorethaneightypercentofcompaniessurveyedrequirepre-arbitrationmediation).

65.Seeidat23.

66.See,e.g.,(cid:59)iaolingAng(cid:9)Thomas(cid:45).(cid:46)earney,BuildingtheCFPB’sArbitration Archive:ACommentaryonDesign,Implementation,andPrivacy,36REV.BAN(cid:46)IN(cid:42)(cid:9) FIN.L.315,327(2016)(discussingtheprivacyconcernswithmakingarbitrator decisionspubliclyavailable).

67.SeeLampley,supranote8,at1773(cid:177)75. 68.ArbitrationAgreements,82Fed.Reg.33210,33385(cid:177)86 cid:45)uly19,2017)

(codifiedat12C.F.R.pt.1040).

69.Seesupranotes28(cid:177)30andaccompanyingtext. 70.Seesupranotes55(cid:177)57andaccompanyingtext. 71.SeeAlexander(cid:9)Iannarone,supranote3,at1700.

Id.(cid:134)552(b)(6).

72.See5U.S.C.(cid:134)552(b)(4). 73. 74.TheFOIAframeworkappearstobewhatthefederalgovernmentuseswith respecttodisclosureoffederalagencyad(cid:77)udicationdecisionsthatarenototherwise publiclyavailable.OneexampleinvolvestheBoardofImmigrationAppeals,which makesitsunpublisheddecisionsaccessiblepursuanttoFOIA.SeeExecutiveOfficeof ImmigrationReview,FOIAPublicAccessLink,FOIA,https:(cid:18)(cid:18)foia.eoir.(cid:77)ustice.gov(cid:18) app(cid:18)ReadingRoom.aspx(lastvisitedSept.13,2024).

75.Othercommentatorshaverecommendedimposingreportingobligationson

arbitrationparties.SeeLampley,supranote8,at1775(cid:177)78. 76.Seesupranotes15(cid:177)19andaccompanyingtext. 77.SeeLampley,supranote8,at1771(notingthatparty-specificreportingmay

makeiteasiertoidentifyrepeat-playerbias).

78.See,e.g.,D.C.CODE(cid:134)16-4430(b)(2001)(cid:30)MD.CODEANN.,COM.LAW(cid:134)14-

3903(c)(LexisNexis2011)(cid:30)CAL.CIV.PROC.CODE(cid:134)1281.96(c)(1)(West2020).

79.Seesupranotes21(cid:177)22andaccompanyingtext. 80.MD.CODEANN.,COM.LAW,(cid:134)14-3905(cid:30)D.C.CODE(cid:134)16-4430(i). 81.CAL.CIVILPROC.CODE(cid:134)1281.96(cid:30)ME.REV.STAT.tit.10,(cid:134)1394(cid:30)N.(cid:45).STAT.

ANN.(cid:134)2A:23B-36.

82.See9U.S.C.(cid:134)5. 83.See,e.g.,Inetianborv.CashCall,Inc.,768F.3d1346,1349(cid:177)50(11thCir.2014) (explainingwhenacourtcandesignateasubstitutearbitratoriftheinitialarbitratoris unavailable,aswellaswhenitshoulddeclarethearbitrationclauseunenforceableifthe designatedarbitratorisunavailable).

84.MD.CODEANN.,COM.LAW(cid:134)14-3905(b)(statingthatnoncompliance(cid:179)may notbethesolereasontorefusetoenforceanaward(cid:180)butthatitmaybeconsideredasa factorinaddressingwhetherthearbitrationclauseisunconscionableorotherwise unenforceable).

85.Seesupranotes21(cid:177)23andaccompanyingtext. 86.ArbitrationAgreements,82Fed.Reg.33210,33385(cid:177)86 cid:45)uly19,2017) (codifiedat12C.F.R.1040)(explainingthatunderitsruletheCFPBwouldmaintaina recordsrepositorythatitwouldpublishonitswebsiteinasearchableformat).

87.SeeStatisticsandReports,U.S.COURTS,https:(cid:18)(cid:18)www.uscourts.gov(cid:18)datanews(cid:18)reports(cid:18)statistical-reports(cid:18)federal-court-management-statistics(lastvisitedDec. 16,2024).

88.See,e.g.,MD.CODEANN.,COM.LAW(cid:134)14-3905(c)(LexisNexis2024)(cid:30)D.C.

CODE(cid:134)16-4430(i)(2024).

V.CONCLUSION

89.See,e.g.,(cid:45).Maria(cid:42)lover,MassArbitration,74STAN.L.REV.1283,1289

(2022).

90.SeeAnnie(cid:46)arni,HouseDysfunctionbytheNumbers:724Votes,Only27Laws (Dec.19,2023),https:(cid:18)(cid:18)www.nytimes.com(cid:18)2023(cid:18)12(cid:18)19(cid:18) Enacted,N.(cid:60).TIMES us(cid:18)politics(cid:18)house-republicans-laws-year.html of Representativespassedonlytwenty-sevenbillsin2023,makingitaslowerlawmaking period(cid:179)thananyothertimeinthelastdecade(cid:180 .

theU.S.House

(stating