A General Theory of Eminent Domain
Stoebuck, William B.
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- 2024Brinkmann v. Town of Southold, New York 2d Cir.
- 2021PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey SCOTUS
- 2005Hansen v. United States Fed. Cl.
- 2003Eggleston v. Pierce County Wash.
- 2000Manufactured Housing Communities v. State Wash.
- 1999Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City Environmental, L.L.C. Ill. App. Ct.
- 1982Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. U.S.
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Abstract
In perspective, then, the constitutional eminent domain clauses are not ends in themselves, nor are they beginnings. They are formal, concise statements of principles recognized and enshrined, but not invented, by the constitution maker. The real significance and meaning of these principles, therefore, depends on the discovery of their historical and theoretical development, rather than solely on the interpretations of the constitutions. The purpose of this article is to develop a framework, based on that discovery, for analyzing the principles of eminent domain.
It will impose order upon our inquiry if we organize it under the following heads: the act of taking, the compensation requirement, the public-purpose limitation, and the concept of property.