trial violation occurs within a reasonable time

operates as a waiver of any objections. Cook v. State, 631 P.2d 5, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 358 (Wyo. 1981). Acceptable continuances for reasonable time for convenience of counsel are appro- priate to extend the speedy trial time limita- tions within the continued responsibility of the trial court. DeSpain v. State, 774 P.2d 77, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 109 (Wyo. 1989). Long delay, not caused by defendant, unconstitutional. — A delay of over 1½ years between the filing of the criminal complaint and the subsequent trial violated defendant’s constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy trial, where none of the causes for the delay could be attributed to defendant. Harvey v. State, 774 P.2d 87, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 111 (Wyo. 1989), reh’g denied, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. June 12, 1989). The defendant was denied the right to a speedy trial, where, of the 18 months taken to bring him to trial following the initial com- plaint, he was jointly responsible for three, or perhaps four, months of the delay, with a bal- ance of at least 14 months for which the state offered no plausible explanation or justifica- tion. Phillips v. State, 774 P.2d 118, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 110 (Wyo. 1989), reh’g denied, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 152 (Wyo. June 12, 1989). right Defendant’s constitutional to speedy trial was not violated under the following facts: (1) although there was a sufficient unnecessary delay — six months — to trigger the applicable four-part balancing test, the delay was not outrageous; (2) while the prosecutor did not have a good reason for the delay — his indecision as to the constitutional- ity of the original charge, aggravated vehicular homicide —, at least his motives were legiti- mate; (3) the defendant preserved his speedy trial right by raising timely objections; but (4) the defendant could not prove prejudice, in that the testimony of his chief witness, who disap- peared before trial, was stipulated to by the prosecution, and in that he was free on bond during the entire proceeding. Caton v. State, 709 P.2d 1260, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 621 (Wyo. 1985). Sixty-eight days from the return of the record to the district court, following appeal from dismissal of the charge, to trial was not unrea- sonable, and this period of time did not violate any rule regarding a speedy trial. Sodergren v. State, 715 P.2d 170, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 485 (Wyo. 1986) (plurality opinion) . The defendant’s right to speedy trial was not violated where there was a 113-day delay be- tween the initial trial date and a rescheduled trial date, and the delay was caused by the defendant’s motion for a continuance following the prosecution’s announcement of additional charges to be filed, the defendant made no complaint about the delay until relatively late in the 113-day period, and the defendant failed to show any prejudice to his defense caused by the delay. Whiteplume v. State, 841 P.2d 1332, 1992 Wyo. LEXIS 159 (Wyo. 1992). Delay of 244 days not presumptively prejudicial. — A delay of 244 days between the filing of the complaint and the commence- ment of the trial was not presumptively preju- dicial. Osborne v. State, 806 P.2d 272, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 20 (Wyo. 1991).