Separation and Exclusion of Witnesses

(A) Except as provided in division (B) of this rule, at the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own motion. An order directing the “exclusion” or “separation” of witnesses or the like, in general terms without specification of other or additional limitations, is effective only to require the exclusion of witnesses from the hearing during the testimony of other witnesses. (B) This rule does not authorize exclusion of any of the following persons from the hearing: (1) A party who is a natural person; An officer or employee of a party that is not a natural person designated as its (2) representative by its attorney; A person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of (3) the party’s cause; In a criminal proceeding, a victim of the charged offense to the extent that the (4) victim’s presence is authorized by statute enacted by the General Assembly or by the Ohio Constitution. As used in this rule, “victim” has the same meaning as provided in Chapter 2930 of the Revised Code. Effective Date: July 1, 1980 Amended: July 1, 2001; July 1, 2003; July 1, 2019; July 1, 2025 Evidence Rule 615 Exclusion of Witnesses Staff Note (July 1, 2001 Amendment) Divisions (1) – (3) of the previous rule were redesignated as divisions (A) – (C). Clarifying punctuation was inserted immediately before division (A), and in division (C) a masculine reference was replaced with gender-neutral language. No substantive change was intended by either of these amendments. The substantive amendment added division (D) to the rule recognizing a new category of witnesses who are not subject to an order excluding them from hearing the testimony of other witnesses. In particular, the amended rule permits the victim of an offense to be present at a criminal proceeding regarding the offense to the extent that the victim’s presence is authorized by statute enacted by the General Assembly. The right of a victim to be present is limited to those persons who are “victims” within the meaning of the constitutional provisions regarding victims’ rights. See Ohio Const., Art. I, § 10a. The amendment is designed to harmonize the rule with the provisions of R.C. 2930.09, which permits a victim to be present at any stage of a criminal proceeding conducted on the record (other than a grand jury proceeding) when the defendant is present, "unless the court determines that exclusion of the victim is necessary to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial." Ordinarily, rules governing witness sequestration would be regarded as “procedural” matters within the meaning of the Modern Courts Amendment, Ohio Const., Art. IV, § 5(B), so that a rule of practice and procedure (such as Evid.R. 615) would prevail over an inconsistent statute on the same subject (such as R.C. 2930.09). In this instance, however, the statute involves an exercise of the General Assembly’s power under the victims’ rights provisions of the Ohio Constitution. Ohio Const., Art. I, § 10a. It is at least arguable that legislation enacted under the authority of section 10a is not displaced or rendered ineffective by reason of its inconsistency with a rule of practice and procedure. The amendment is intended to eliminate the conflict between the statute and the rule by deferring to the statutory right of a victim to be present at criminal proceedings. The deference extends only to the right of a victim to be present, and only in criminal proceedings. Moreover, whatever the statutory definition of “victim,” the rule exempts from sequestration only those persons who are permitted by statute to be present and who are “victims” within the meaning of Article I, Section 10a of the Ohio Constitution. These limitations correspond to the extent of the General Assembly’s power under the victims’ rights provisions of the constitution. The principal object of witness sequestration orders is to minimize the risk that a witness’s testimony will be materially affected by hearing the testimony of other witnesses. Neither the statute nor the amended rule impairs the ability of trial courts to deal effectively with this risk when it exists. Under the statute (as well as under the constitution), the victim’s right to be present is limited by the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Thus, exclusion of a victim-witness would be permissible in cases in which the trial court is persuaded that the victim-witness’s testimony would be altered by reason of the witness’s presence during the testimony of other witnesses. Staff Note (July 1, 2003 Amendment)