Rendition and entry of orders and judgments

(a) Rendition of orders and judgments. A judge may render an order or a judgment: (1) by executing a separate written document, (2) by including the order or judgment in a judicial opinion, (3) by endorsing upon a motion the words "granted," "denied," "moot," or words of similar import, and dating and signing or initialing it, or (4) by making or causing to be made a notation in the court records, or (5) by executing and transmitting an electronic document to the electronic-filing system. (b) Sufficiency of order or judgment. An order or a judgment need not be phrased in formal language nor bear particular words of adjudication. A written order or a judgment will be sufficient if it is signed or initialed by the judge, or by the clerk in the case of a judgment entered pursuant to Rule 55(b)(1), Rule 71B(f), or Rule 71C(f), and indicates an intention to adjudicate, considering the whole record, and if it indicates the substance of the adjudication. (c) Entry of order or judgment. Upon rendition of an order or a judgment as provided in subdivision (a)(1-4) of this rule, the clerk shall forthwith enter such order or judgment in the court record. An order or a judgment shall be deemed "entered" within the meaning of these Rules and the Rules of Appellate Procedure as of the actual date of the input of the order or judgment into the State Judicial Information System. An order or a judgment rendered electronically by the judge under subdivision (a)(5) of this rule shall be deemed “entered” within the meaning of these Rules and the Rules of Appellate Procedure as of the date the order or judgment is electronically transmitted by the judge to the electronicfiling system. The entry of the judgment or order shall not be delayed for the taxing of costs. Interest upon a judgment runs from the date the court renders the judgment. (d) Entry of order or judgment in probate court. Upon rendition of an order or a judgment in the probate court as provided in subdivision (a)(1)-(4) of this rule, the judge or clerk of the probate court shall forthwith enter such order or judgment in the court record. The entry of the judgment or order shall not be delayed for the taxing of costs. Interest upon a judgment runs from the date the probate court renders the judgment. (dc) District court rule. Rule 58 applies in the district courts. [Amended 1-23-84, eff. 3-1-84; Amended 1-21-86, eff. 9-1-87; Amended eff. 101- 95; Amended eff. 9-19-2006; Amended eff 10-24-2008; Amended 5-29-2009, eff. 7-1-2009; Amended 12-6-2012, eff 1-1-2013.] Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption The rule contains the essential ideas of Federal Rule 58, that judgment is to be entered “forthwith” upon its rendition and that the judgment is to be short and simple rather than filled with elaborate recitals. See also Rule 54(a). But the rule departs substantially in form from the Federal Rule in order to clarify the procedure as to rendition of judgments, and to preserve traditional Alabama practice of “bench notes.” The Rule also permits judgments as a part of an opinion quite different from Federal Rule 58 which requires every judgment to be set forth on a separate document. Both under prior Alabama practice and the federal rules, the terms “rendition” and “entry” signify two entirely distinct events in theory, though in practice the two events may take place within such a short space of time as to make it unnecessary to distinguish between them. “Rendition” is the judicial pronouncement of the judgment or decree, the utterance by the judge of his decision, while “entry” of the judgment is the ministerial act of the clerk in recording the judgment duly rendered by the judge. It has been customary in Alabama for judgment to be rendered at law by a notation on the bench notes, while in equity a decree is rendered by the execution of a formal written document. Subdivision (a) permits judgment to be rendered by either of these methods, and the third and fourth options provided in that subdivision permit rendition by including the order or judgment, or a direction for its entry, in an opinion or memorandum. The rules intend that judgment shall be rendered and entered simply and quickly. Thus while the court can delay rendition of judgment in order to prepare a separate written document, pursuant to Rule 58(a)(2), this course should not be followed where an immediate notation on the bench notes will serve as well. The language of subdivision (b) is adapted from In re Forstner Chain Corp., 177 F.2d 572, 576 (1st Cir.1949). It emphasizes the intention, stated in the above paragraph, to do away with unnecessary technicalities heretofore common in orders, judgments, and decrees. Such cases as Johnson v. Bryars, 264 Ala. 243, 86 So.2d 371 (1956), and Mangham v. Mangham, 263 Ala. 672, 83 So.2d 721 (1955), will no longer be authoritative under this rule. Subdivision (c) requires the clerk to note a judgment or order in the Civil Docket forthwith upon its rendition. The notation of the judgment is not to be delayed unless the judgment or order itself contains a specific direction to delay entry or the case is subject to Rule 54(b). The clerk is required to notify all parties not otherwise notified immediately upon entry of a judgment or order. See Rule 77(d). A judgment is effective at the time of its notation in the civil docket or its notation on separately maintained bench notes or upon the filing of a separate judgment or order. The time limitation in which to attack the judgment runs from the occurrence of any of the events specified in the preceding sentence. See Rules 59, 60 and 62. In many circuits, bench notes are kept on the consolidated docket book. In some circuits the large pages in the docket book are not taken from the clerk’s office, necessitating maintenance of separate bench notes. Rule 58(c) sets forth the requirement of notation in the civil docket, if separately maintained. In those circuits where bench notes are made directly on the docket sheet, Rule 58(c) will have already been complied with. The clerk is required to copy every final judgment into the minute book, Rule 79(b), but it is the notation of the judgment or order on the civil docket, rather than the later act, which is of legal significance. United States v. Wissahickon Tool Works, 200 F.2d 936 (2d Cir.1952); cf. United States v. Roth, 208 F.2d 467 (2d Cir.1953). The notation of the judgment in the civil docket need not contain the full text of the judgment. All that is required is that it show the “substance” of the judgment or order, Rule 79(a). Committee Comments to Amendment to Rule 58(b) Effective March 1, 1984 This amendment added the requirement that a judgment, order, or minute entry be signed or initialed by the judge. Under Rule 58(b) there have developed some problems in determining whether an order of the court is intended to serve as a judgment dispositive of the lawsuit or as an order of lesser proportions. See e.g., Guilford v. Spartan Food Systems, Inc., 372 So.2d 7 (Ala.1979). This amendment requires the judge to add his signature or initials to the place in the record where the notation of the fact of the judgment appears. While this amendment does not alter the standard for evaluating the sufficiency of the phraseology, it does require, in the form of a signing or initialing, a direct judicial intervention in the process of making up the judgment, order, or minute entry. This mandate of direct involvement by the court should result in a greater concern for the necessity for clarity in a judgment or order. Committee Comments to Amendment to Rule 58(b) Effective September 1, 1987