is revised to add a “good-faith belief” provision consistent with the holding in

Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct

Rule: 3.4

Jurisdiction: OH

Bluebook Citation: Ohio Prof. Cond. R. 3.4

State v. Gillard (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 226. Model Rule 3.4(f) is deleted because its provisions are inconsistent with a lawyer’s obligations under Ohio law, and the corresponding Comment [4] also is removed. Division (g) is inserted to incorporate Ohio DR 7-109(B). 118 RULE 3.5: IMPARTIALITY AND DECORUM OF THE TRIBUNAL (a) A lawyer shall not do any of the following: (1) seek to influence a judicial officer, juror, prospective juror, or other official by means prohibited by law; (2) lend anything of value or give anything of more than de minimis value to a judicial officer, official, or employee of a tribunal; (3) communicate ex parte with either of the following: (i) a judicial officer or other official as to the merits of the case during the proceeding unless authorized to do so by law or court order; (ii) a juror or prospective juror during the proceeding unless otherwise authorized to do so by law or court order. (4) communicate with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury if any of the following applies: (i) the communication is prohibited by law or court order; (ii) communicate; the juror has made known to the lawyer a desire not to (iii) the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress, or harassment; (5) engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal; (6) engage in undignified or discourteous conduct that is degrading to a tribunal. (b) A lawyer shall reveal promptly to the tribunal improper conduct by a juror or prospective juror, or by another toward a juror, prospective juror, or family member of a juror or prospective juror, of which the lawyer has knowledge. Comment [1] Many forms of improper influence upon a tribunal are proscribed by criminal law. Others are specified in the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, with which an advocate should be familiar. A lawyer is required to avoid contributing to a violation of such provisions. As used in division (a)(2), “de minimis” means an insignificant item or interest that could not raise a reasonable question as to the impartiality of a judicial officer, official, or employee of a tribunal. 119 [2] During a proceeding a lawyer may not communicate ex parte with persons serving in an official capacity in the proceeding, such as judges, masters, magistrates, or jurors, unless authorized to do so by law, court order, or these rules. [3] A lawyer may on occasion want to communicate with a juror or prospective juror after the jury has been discharged. The lawyer may do so unless the communication is prohibited by law or a court order but must respect the desire of the juror not to talk with the lawyer. The lawyer may not engage in improper conduct during the communication. [4] The advocate’s function is to present evidence and argument so that the cause may be decided according to law. Refraining from abusive or obstreperous conduct is a corollary of the advocate’s right to speak on behalf of litigants. A lawyer may stand firm against abuse by a judge but should avoid reciprocation; the judge’s default is no justification for similar dereliction by an advocate. An advocate can present the cause, protect the record for subsequent review, and preserve professional integrity by patient firmness no less effectively than by belligerence or theatrics. [5] The duty to refrain from disruptive, undignified, or discourteous conduct applies to any proceeding of a tribunal, including a deposition. See Rule 1.0(o). Comparison to former Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility

Chat with this court rule using AI

Ask CiteLaw's AI Navigator anything about this court rule, verify citations, and research related authorities. Sign up for CiteLaw free today to get started.