Hearsay Exceptions: Availability of

Declarant Immaterial The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (1) Statement by a party opponent. A state- ment that is being offered against a party and is (A) the party’s own statement, in either an individ- ual or a representative capacity, (B) a statement that the party has adopted or approved, (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, (D) a statement by the party’s agent, servant or employee, concerning a matter within the scope 32 of the agency or employment, and made during the existence of the relationship, (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party while the conspiracy is ongoing and in furtherance of the conspiracy, (F) in an action for a debt for which the party was surety, a statement by the party’s principal relating to the principal’s obligations, or (G) a statement made by a predecessor in title of the party, pro- vided the declarant and the party are sufficiently in privity that the statement of the declarant would affect the party’s interest in the property in question. The hearsay statement itself may not be consid- ered to establish the declarant’s authority under (C), the existence or scope of the relationship under (D), or the existence of the conspiracy or participation in it under (E). (2) Spontaneous utterance. A statement relat- ing to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. (3) Statement of then existing physical con- dition. A statement of the declarant’s then existing physical condition, provided that the statement is a natural expression of the condition and is not a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed. (4) Statement of then existing mental or emotional condition. A statement of the declar- ant’s then existing mental or emotional condition, including a statement indicating a present inten- tion to do a particular act in the immediate future, provided that the statement is a natural expres- sion of the condition and is not a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed. (5) Statement for purposes of obtaining medical diagnosis or treatment. A statement made for purposes of obtaining a medical diagno- sis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof, insofar as reasonably pertinent to the medical diagnosis or treatment. (6) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning an event about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient rec- ollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness at or about the time of the event recorded and to reflect that knowledge correctly. (7) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, provided (A) the record, report, statement or data compilation was made by a public official under a duty to make it, (B) the record, report, statement or data Connecticut Code of Evidence compilation was made in the course of his or her official duties, and (C) the official or someone with a duty to transmit information to the official had personal knowledge of the matters contained in the record, report, statement or data compilation. (8) Statement in learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness on cross-examination or relied on by the expert witness in direct examination, a statement con- tained in a published treatise, periodical or pam- phlet on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, recognized as a standard authority in the field by the witness, other expert witness or judicial notice. (9) Statement in ancient documents. A state- ment in a document in existence for more than thirty years if it is produced from proper custody and otherwise free from suspicion. (10) Published compilations. Market quota- tions, tabulations, lists, directories or other pub- lished compilations, that are recognized authority on the subject, or are otherwise trustworthy. (11) Statement in family bible. A statement of fact concerning personal or family history con- tained in a family bible. (12) Personal identification. Testimony by a witness of his or her own name or age. (Amended June 29, 2007, to take effect Jan. 1, 2008; amended Dec. 14, 2017, to take effect Feb. 1, 2018.) COMMENTARY (1) Statement by party opponent. Section 8-3 (1) sets forth six categories of party opponent admissions that were excepted from the hearsay rule at com- mon law and adds one more category that has been adopted in the Federal Rules of Evidence and a majority of other states. (A) The first category excepts from the hearsay rule a party’s own statement when offered against him or her. E.g., In re Zoarski, 227 Conn. 784, 796, 632 A.2d 1114 (1993); State v. Woodson, 227 Conn. 1, 15, 629 A.2d 386 (1993). Under Sec- tion 8-3 (1) (A), a statement is admissible against its maker, whether he or she was acting in an individual or representative capacity when the statement was made. The rule is in accord with the modern trend. E.g., Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d) (2) (A). A party statement is admissible under Section 8-3 (1), regardless of whether the person making the statement has personal knowledge of the facts stated therein. Dreier v. Upjohn Co., 196 Conn. 242, 249, 492 A.2d 164 (1985). If the statement at issue was made by a party opponent in a deposition, the statement is admissible in accordance with Practice Book § 13-31 (a) (3). That provision permits an adverse party to use at trial, for any purpose, the deposition of a party, or a person who at the time of the deposition was an officer, direc- tor, managing agent or employee of a party, or a person desig- nated under Practice Book § 13-27 (h) to testify on behalf of a public or private corporation, partnership, association or government agency. This rule of practice was deemed ‘‘analo- gous’’ to the hearsay exception covered by Section 8-3 (1) in Gateway Co. v. DiNoia, 232 Conn. 223, 238 n.11, 654 A.2d 342 (1995) (construing Practice Book (1978–97) § 248 (1) (c), predecessor to Practice Book § 13-31 (a) (3)). 33