General Rule of Competency

Except as otherwise provided by the Code, every person is presumed competent to be a witness. (Amended Dec. 14, 2017, to take effect Feb. 1, 2018.) COMMENTARY Section 6-1 establishes a general presumption of compe- tency subject to exceptions. Cf. State v. Weinberg, 215 Conn. 231, 243–44, 575 A.2d 1003, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967, 111 S. Ct. 430, 112 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1990). Consequently, a status or attribute of a person that early common law recognized as a per se ground for disqualification; e.g., Lucas v. State, 23 Conn. 18, 19–20 (1854) (wife of accused incompetent to testify in criminal proceeding); State v. Gardner, 1 Root (Conn.) 485, 485 (1793) (person convicted of theft incompetent to testify); is now merely a factor bearing on that person’s credibility as a witness. Section 6-1 is consistent with the development of state statu- tory law, which has eliminated several automatic grounds for witness incompetency. E.g., General Statutes § 52-145 (no person is disqualified as witness because of his or her interest in outcome of litigation, disbelief in existence of supreme being or prior criminal conviction); General Statutes § 54-84a (one spouse is competent to testify for or against other spouse in criminal proceeding); General Statutes § 54-86h (no child is automatically incompetent to testify because of age). The determination of a witness’ competency is a preliminary question for the court. E.g., Manning v. Michael, 188 Conn. 607, 610, 452 A.2d 1157 (1982); State v. Brigandi, 186 Conn. 521, 534, 442 A.2d 927 (1982); see Section 1-3 (a).