gas lease was considered a final decision of an

agency which was ripe for judicial review. Sub- sequent correspondence between the attorney general’s office and the lessee’s attorney, which sought to clarify the finality of the agency’s action, had no bearing on the finality and did not serve to toll the 30-day period of time in which to file a petition for review. Scanlon v. Schrinar, 759 P.2d 1243, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 105 (Wyo. 1988), reh’g denied, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 137 (Wyo. Sept. 20, 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1016, 109 S. Ct. 1131, 103 L. Ed. 2d 193, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 976 (U.S. 1989). Zoning board order denying challeng- er’s petition for rehearing was not appeal- able final order since the board lacked au- thority to rehear its original decision, which granted a use permit. Further, the filing of the petition for rehearing did not toll the running of the time period for filing a notice of appeal of final agency action under this rule. Rosen- berger v. Casper Bd. of Adjustment, 765 P.2d 367, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 176 (Wyo. 1988). Verbal and written notice constitute proper notification. — Where there was a verbal notice which was followed up with a written notice, the petitioner received due and proper notification of the suspension of his driver’s license. Department of Revenue & Taxation v. Irvine, 589 P.2d 1295, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 358 (Wyo. 1979). Late appeal excused by mistaken belief. — Where appellee justifiably, but wrongly, be- lieved that a challenge to the necessity of a road was a condition precedent to a hearing on the elements of adverse possession, he should not