Evidence of Character and Con-

duct of Witness (a) Opinion and reputation evidence of char- acter. The credibility of a witness may be impeached or supported by evidence of character for truthfulness or untruthfulness in the form of opinion or reputation. Evidence of truthful charac- ter is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been impeached. (b) Specific instances of conduct. (1) General rule. A witness may be asked, in good faith, about specific instances of conduct of the witness, if probative of the witness’ character for untruthfulness. Connecticut Code of Evidence (2) Extrinsic evidence. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of impeaching the witness’ credibility under subdivi- sion (1), may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. (c) Inquiry of character witness. A witness who has testified about the character of another witness for truthfulness or untruthfulness may be asked on cross-examination, in good faith, about specific instances of conduct of the other witness, if probative of the other witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. COMMENTARY Section 4-4 (a) (3) provides for the admission of evidence addressing the character of a witness for truthfulness or untruthfulness to support or impeach the credibility of such witness. Section 6-6 addresses when such evidence is admis- sible and the appropriate methods of proof. (a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The first sentence of subsection (a) reflects common law. See, e.g., State v. Gould, 241 Conn. 1, 19, 695 A.2d 1022 (1997); State v. Gelinas, 160 Conn. 366, 367–68, 279 A.2d 552 (1971); State v. Pettersen, 17 Conn. App. 174, 181, 551 A.2d 763 (1988). Evidence admitted under subsection (a) must relate to the witness’ character for truthfulness, and thus gen- eral character evidence is inadmissible. See, e.g., Dore v. Babcock, 74 Conn. 425, 429–30, 50 A. 1016 (1902). The second sentence of subsection (a) also adopts common law. See State v. Ward, 49 Conn. 429, 442 (1881); Rogers v. Moore, 10 Conn. 13, 16–17 (1833); see also State v. Suck- ley, 26 Conn. App. 65, 72, 597 A.2d 1285 (1991). A foundation establishing personal contacts with the witness or knowledge of the witness’ reputation in the community is a prerequisite to the introduction of opinion or reputation testi- mony bearing on a witness’ character for truthfulness. See, e.g., State v. Gould, supra, 241 Conn. 19–20; State v. George, 194 Conn. 361, 368–69, 481 A.2d 1068 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1191, 105 S. Ct. 963, 83 L. Ed. 2d 968 (1985). Whether an adequate foundation has been laid is a matter within the discretion of the court. E.g., State v. Gould, supra, 19; State v. George, supra, 368; see Section 1-3 (a). (b) Specific instances of conduct. Under subdivision (1), a witness may be asked about his or her specific instances of conduct that, while not resulting in criminal conviction, are probative of the witness’ character for untruthfulness. See, e.g., State v. Chance, 236 Conn. 31, 60, 671 A.2d 323 (1996); State v. Roma, 199 Conn. 110, 116–17, 513 A.2d 116 (1986); Martyn v. Donlin, 151 Conn. 402, 408, 198 A.2d 700 (1964). Such inquiries must be made in good faith. See State v. Chance, supra, 60; Marsh v. Wash- burn, 11 Conn. App. 447, 452–53, 528 A.2d 382 (1987). The misconduct evidence sought to be admitted must be probative of the witness’ character for untruthfulness, not merely general bad character. E.g., Demers v. State, 209 Conn. 143, 156, 547 A.2d 28 (1988); Vogel v. Sylvester, 148 Conn. 666, 675, 174 A.2d 122 (1961). Impeachment through the use of specific instance evidence under subdivision (1) is committed to the trial court’s discretion- ary authority. State v. Vitale, 197 Conn. 396, 401, 497 A.2d 956 (1985). The trial court must, however, exercise its discretionary authority by determining whether the specific instance evi- dence is probative of the witness’ character for untruthfulness and whether its probative value is outweighed by any of the Section 4-3 balancing factors. State v. Martin, 201 Conn. 74, 88–89, 513 A.2d 116 (1986); see Section 4-3. 21