does not attempt to set arbitrary time limits (other than those resulting from the

demand), because they would have to be circumscribed by numerous specific exclusions (See ABA Standards, Speedy Trial, 2.3 (Approved Draft, 1968)) which are covered in any event by the more general terms of the rule. See ABA Standards, Speedy Trial, 4.1, Pre-Trial Release, 5.10 (Approved Drafts, 1968) in which the consequences are set forth. The consequences and the time limits beyond which a defendant is considered to have been denied the constitutional right to a speedy trial are left to judicial decision. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519-36 (1972). The constitutional right to a speedy trial is triggered not when the plea is entered but when a charge is issued or an arrest is made. State v. Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224, 235 (Minn. 1986). The existence or absence of the demand under Rule 11.09 provides a factor that may be taken into account in determining whether the defendant has been unconstitutionally denied a speedy trial. See Barker v. Wingo, supra.