ciples. To do otherwise is perverting the func-

tion of the preliminary injunction. Simpson v. Petroleum, Inc., 548 P.2d 1, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 1976). A temporary restraining order or pre- liminary injunction is in the nature of a provisional remedy, and one may be issued at any time during the pending litigation. We- ber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, 519 P.2d 972, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 190 (Wyo. 1974). But awarding of injunction not to cir- cumvent trial. — Generally, a preliminary injunction will not be awarded where its effect is to give the principal relief plaintiff seeks without bringing the cause to trial. Simpson v. Petroleum, Inc., 548 P.2d 1, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 1976). A suit for injunction is a civil suit, and the rules of procedure are the same as in any other civil suit. Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, 519 P.2d 972, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 190 (Wyo. 1974). Complaint must clearly set out all nec- essary facts. — The extraordinary character of the injunctive remedy requires that the com- plaint clearly set out all the facts necessary to establish such right. Tri-County Elec. Ass’n v. Gillette, 525 P.2d 3, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 226 (Wyo. 1974). Order advancing hearing required. — The language of subdivision (b) is abundantly clear in its very terms that there must be an order advancing a hearing on the temporary restraining order. Simpson v. Petroleum, Inc., 548 P.2d 1, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 1976). As is notice of advancement. — When a hearing on a preliminary injunction becomes a hearing on the merits, there must be notice of such advancement. Simpson v. Petroleum, Inc., 548 P.2d 1, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 1976). The specificity provisions of subdivision (d) are not mere technical requirements. — Bard Ranch Co. v. Weber, 557 P.2d 722, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 232 (Wyo. 1976). When party enjoined can recover. — If the plaintiff prevails in the final hearing on the injunction, the defendant cannot recover even if the temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction was wrongfully issued. However, good sense and equity dictate an exception to this rule when the temporary restraining order is overly broad or too far-reaching in scope. Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, 519 P.2d 972, 1974 Wyo. LEXIS 190 (Wyo. 1974). Guidelines provided for establishing boundaries of supersedeas bond. — See Wyoming Bancorporation v. Bonham, 563 P.2d 1382, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 254 (Wyo.), reh’g de- nied, 566 P.2d 219, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 329 (Wyo. 1977). District court has jurisdiction to enforce zoning decision by injunction. — Wardwell Dev. Corp. v. Board of County Comm’rs, 639 P.2d 888, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 286 (Wyo. 1982). In adoption proceedings, court may deny injunction unnecessarily restricting natural father’s activities. — In connection with adoption proceedings, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a permanent injunction restraining the natural father, who was in prison and who threatened to do bodily harm to numerous people, including the pro- spective adoptive parents, from contacting those persons or seeking them out after his release, and restraining him from entering cer- tain locations after his release. The requested relief was over-broad, sought protection for persons not parties to the proceedings, re- quested protection for persons not named, and unnecessarily sought to restrict the father’s activities. PAA v. Doe, 702 P.2d 1259 (Wyo. 1985). Permanent injunction. — An injunction enjoining land owners from interfering with an irrigation company’s access to and repair of its facilities across the owners land was proper and specific enough where there was absolutely no possibility of uncertainty or confusion when the merits of the case had already been decided and the latest injunction merely told the own- ers for the third time that they were restrained from interfering with the company’s access to its facilities. Wilson v. Lucerne Canal & Power Co., 2003 WY 126, 77 P.3d 412, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 2003). In an irrigation company’s suit to enjoin land owners from interfering with access, the entry of a permanent injunction at a preliminary hearing was proper, and did not violate the owner’s due process rights, where the district court’s failure to enter an order of consolidation was not erroneous because the underlying rights of the parties were determined in earlier litigation and were therefore res judicata. Wil- son v. Lucerne Canal & Power Co., 2003 WY 126, 77 P.3d 412, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 2003). Likelihood of harm. — Ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO) against an anti-abor- tion organization was issued in violation of the First Amendment and this rule. Although it was unlikely that the organization suffered damages as a result of the TRO, the district court was nonetheless required to make find- ings as to the likelihood of harm to the organi- zation, and it abused its discretion in issuing the TRO without those required findings. Op- eration Save Am. v. City of Jackson, 2012 WY 51, 275 P.3d 438, 2012 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 2012).