(11) third-party culpability by defendant’s proffer of third

party’s other crimes, wrongs or acts; State v. Hedge, supra, 297 Conn. 650–52. Admissibility of other crimes, wrongs or acts evidence is contingent on satisfying the relevancy standards and balanc- ing test set forth in Sections 4-1 and 4-3, respectively. For other crimes, wrongs or acts evidence to be admissible, the court must determine that the evidence is probative of one or more of the enumerated purposes for which it is offered and that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. E.g., State v. Figueroa, 235 Conn. 145, 162, 665 A.2d 63 (1995); State v. Cooper, 227 Conn. 417, 425–28, 630 A.2d 1043 (1993). Although the Supreme Court has established no abso- lute time limit that would bar admissibility of uncharged miscon- duct, it has suggested that remote prior misconduct must bear a substantial similarity to conduct at issue and be of an aberrant or compulsive nature to be admissible. See State v. Chyung, supra, 325 Conn. 264, 266 n.27 (fourteen year gap between incidents of misconduct did not render prior misconduct irrele- vant ‘‘given the strong similarities between the two incidents and the strongly aberrational nature of the defendant’s con- duct’’); cf. State v. Snelgrove, supra, 288 Conn. 761 (noting that, ‘‘ordinarily, a gap of fourteen years would raise serious questions as to whether the prior misconduct was too remote in time’’). Concerns about remoteness are lessened if the defendant was incarcerated for a substantial period during the gap. See State v. Snelgrove, supra, 761–62; State v. Murrell, 7 Conn. App. 75, 89, 507 A.2d 1033 (1986). The purposes enumerated in subsection (c) for which other crimes, wrongs or acts evidence may be admitted are intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. Neither subsection (a) nor subsection (c) precludes a court from recognizing other appropriate purposes for which other crimes, wrongs or acts evidence may be admitted, provided the evidence is not intro- duced to prove a person’s bad character or criminal tenden- cies, and the probative value of its admission is not outweighed by any of the Section 4-3 balancing factors. (d) Specific instances of conduct when character in issue. Subsection (d) finds support in Connecticut case law. See State v. Miranda, 176 Conn. 107, 112, 405 A.2d 622 (1978); Norton v. Warner, 9 Conn. 172, 174 (1832).