Zinovy V. Reytblatt & Natalia B. Romalis-Reytblatt, Petitioners

T.C.

Court: United States Tax Court

Citations: 2001 T.C. Memo. 209

Decision Date: 8/8/2001

Docket Number: 6493-00

Bluebook Citation: Zinovy V. Reytblatt & Natalia B. Romalis-Reytblatt, Petitioners, 2001 T.C. Memo. 209 (T.C. 2001)

More Cases: T.C. decisions from 2001

T.C. Memo. 2001-209 UNITED STATES TAX COURT ZINOVY V. REYTBLATT AND NATALIA B. ROMALIS-REYTBLATT, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 6493-00.

Filed August 8, 2001.

Zinovy V. Reytblatt, pro se.¹ Michael P. Breton, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

POWELL, Special Trial Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioners' 1996 Federal income tax of $2,460.

¹ Petitioner Natalia B. Romalis-Reytblatt did not appear or in any way participate in these proceedings. With regard to her, we ·dismiss this case for failure to prosecute. The decision, when entered, will be in the same amount as determined by the Court against petitioner Zinovy V. Reytblatt. Unless otherwise indicate·d, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

See Rule 123(b).

SERvE0 AUG ô 200L and (7) petitioners were entitled to a deduction of $3,000 for a long-term capital loss.

At the initial hearing petitioner contended that a payment to the Internal Revenue Service in November2 1996 of $2,524 had been made by his wife for the taxable year 1994 and that that amount should have been credited to the 1996 liability.

It appears that.changes were made to petitioners' 1994 tax liability resulting in an underpayment against which a $2,524 payment was made in 1996 and applied to the 1994 liability.

The Court explained at that time that the taxable year 1994 was not before the Court. When petitioner later renewed this issue, the Court pointed out that the 1996 taxable year had not closed at the time of the payment and a liability for that year had not even been determined.

The case was continued for trial to the Special Session of the Court commencing May 17, 2001, in Hartford, Connecticut.

On March 23, 2001, Ms. O'Connor filed a motion to withdraw as counsel.

That motion was granted on March 30, 2001.

Subsequently, petitioner, proceeding pro se, sent various documents3 to the Court:

or November, but It is unclear whether the payment was made in September the exact date does not appear to be material.

Some of the documents received from petitioner have not been filed and will be placed in the Court's correspondence file.

~ 5 - (6) Lastly, on June 18, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion for Reconsideration of Court Ruling Granting Respondent's Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum" and "Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Sanctions on Respondent".

When this case was called, petitioner accused.both Ms.

O'Connor and respondent's counsel of some form of chicanery, the details of which are, at best, confusing. Petitioner seems to indicate that the stipulation of facts he executed is not the same stipulation that was filed with the Court.

But at the initial hearing on March 7, 2001, the Court went over the stipulation of facts, paragraph by paragraph, with petitioner, and that is the stipulation of facts filed with the Court.

Thus, we hold petitioner to the stipulation of facts as filed.

Furthermore, we note that from what we have observed, Ms.

O'Connor and respondent's counsel performed in a completely ethical and professional manner.

It is unseemly that petitioner would besmirch the character of-both counsel in this fashion.

It subsequently became somewhat clear that petitioner contends that, while conceding that his wife and he had omitted the nonemployee compensation from the 1996 tax return, they both had travel expenses that should reduce the amount of taxable income. Petitioner, however, presented no records or other corroborating evidence to document the alleged travel expenses.

statement made in settlement negotiations by Mr. Evans would be inadmissible.

See Fed. R. Evid. 408. Our deposition process should not be used as a harassment device. Accordingly, we deny petitioner's motions for reconsideration of our order quashing the subpoena and the denial of petitioner's motion.'for sanctions.

It appears that our ruling with respect to the alleged travel expenses and the stipulation of facts resolves all the issues properly before this Court in favor of respondent.

An appropriate order and order of dismissal and decision will be entered.

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