Williams v. State

This is an appeal from a conviction for murder under the former Penal Code; punishment was assessed at life.

We find unassigned error that must be considered in the interest of justice. Art. 40.09(13), V.A.C.C.P.

The charge to the jury utterly failed to apply the law to the facts of the case. In Harris v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 522 S.W.2d 199 and Perez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 537 S.W.2d 455, we held such error to be fundamental. We reaffirm those holdings and take this opportunity to further elaborate upon the reasons why this is the law.

There was no objection to the charge for its failure to apply the law to the facts. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that in such situations:

“. . . the judgment shall not be reversed unless the error appearing from the record was calculated to injure the rights of defendant, or unless it appears from the record that the defendant has not had a fair and impartial trial.” Art. 36.19, V.A.C.C.P.

Applying this provision to the failure of the trial court to apply the law to the facts of the case in its charge to the jury, we find that this error was calculated to injure the "rights- of appellant and that he was deprived of a fair and impartial trial for the following reasons.

The law must come from the court, the facts must be decided by the jury, and the charge, to instruct the jury properly, must apply the law to the facts raised by the evidence. It is not sufficient for the jury to receive an abstract instruction on the law and then to render a verdict according to a general conclusion on whether the law has been violated. The State must prove its ease beyond a reasonable doubt and must prove each element of the offense charged. This is the very basis of the case. The prosecutor as advocate for the State’s position may emphasize some elements in his argument and defense counsel as advocate for the accused may emphasize others in his argument, but the court is the only neutral source to which the jury may look for an unbiased application of the law to the facts of the case. An abstract charge does not inform the jury of what facts, if found by it, would constitute proof of the elements of the offense.

A juror is not allowed to impeach his own verdict, and, although jury misconduct may be discovered and proven only by one in a position to know the facts, those with knowledge are properly privileged to decline to discuss the deliberations with anyone. This confidential character of the jury deliberation process, designed to insure the free exchange of viewpoints during that process, is essential to the jury system of criminal justice. However, this confidential character also requires that the members of the jury, before deliberations, receive proper instructions regarding the performance of their civic duty. To allow the jury to receive an application of the law to the facts only from the partisan advocates without a neutral and unbiased instruction on that matter in the charge is to risk the degeneration of trial by jury to a debating contest, where the persuasiveness of competing applications of the law to the facts determines guilt or innocence. There should be but one controlling application of the law to the facts, and that application should come from the court. Its absence impairs the right to trial by jury and, therefore, by definition, is “calculated to injure the rights of defendant,” (Art. 36.19, supra) to a trial by jury.

It is not the function of the charge merely to avoid misleading or confusing the jury: it is the function of the charge to lead and to prevent confusion. A charge that does not apply the law to the facts fails to lead the jury to the threshold of its duty: to decide those fact issues. A charge that leaves application of the law to the facts solely in the hands of the partisan advocates does not guard against the confusion that such partisan claims inspire. Because a charge should affirmatively lead and dispel confusion, and because a charge that does not apply the law to the facts fails to give such guidance, error of this character should remain the subject of a per se rule. Furthermore, the per se rule of Harris and Perez, both supra, is not only fully justified, but also has its ease of understandability and application to commend itself for a permanent place in our jurisprudence.

Finding fundamental reversible error in the court’s charge to the jury, we reverse the judgment and remand the cause.

. The jury charge recited the allegations of the indictment and gave abstract instructions on the law of murder, malice aforethought and accomplice witness testimony, and then charged:

“Now if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that an offense was committed as charged, [note that the law is not applied to the facts of the case] and you further believe from the evidence that the witness, Joseph Goodson, was an accomplice, or you have a reasonable doubt as to whether he was or not, as that term is defined in the foregoing instructions then you cannot convict the defendant upon the testimony of the said Joseph Goodson unless you first believe that his testimony is true and that it shows the defendant is guilty as charged in the indictment; and even then you cannot convict the defendant unless you further believe that there is other evidence in the case, outside of the evidence of the said Joseph Goodson, tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense charged in the indictment, and such corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of an offense.”

The remainder of the charge consisted of instructions that the indictment is no evidence of guilt, to avoid injection of personal knowledge, on selection of a foreman, that the jury is the exclusive judge of facts to be proven and of matters of credibility and weight of the evidence, of appellant’s privilege not to testify, on the burden of proof, and on the use of verdict forms.