Wilkin v. LJB Homes LLC
Ill. App. Ct.
Opinion
2026 IL App (2d) 250182-U
No. 2-25-0182
Order filed March 31, 2026
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not
precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
HAROLD E. WILKIN, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LJB HOMES LLC, Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of DeKalb County.
Honorable Stephanie Klein, Judge, Presiding.
No. 24-SC-1140
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Jorgensen and Schostok concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court properly found that defendant’s return of plaintiff’s security deposit
complied with state and local law; affirmed.
¶2 Plaintiff, Harold E. Wilkin, Jr., pro se, appeals the judgment in favor of defendant, LJB
Homes LLC, pursuant to a lease agreement in which plaintiff was a tenant and defendant was the
landlord. Plaintiff filed a small claims complaint against defendant seeking fees from his security
deposit and other damages. Because we agree with the trial court that defendant’s return of
plaintiff’s security deposit complied with both the DeKalb ordinance and the state statute, we
affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On December 24, 2024, plaintiff filed a small claims complaint alleging that defendant
owed him $800. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that “the lease clearly states the security deposit
is refundable within the law,” but defendant had only returned $580. Plaintiff alleged that
defendant owed him $120 for fees “for forcing plaintiff to find a process server and demand the
security deposit.” Plaintiff further alleged that defendant failed to send “itemized deductions within
30 days of move out, being a multi-unit landlord.” In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant
“produced a false itemized deduction, claiming cleaning the room.” As relief, plaintiff sought full
payment of his security deposit, punitive penalties “up to twice the deposit,” and $120 for process
server fees.
¶5 On April 2, 2025, the court conducted a hearing on plaintiff’s small claims complaint.
Plaintiff’s counsel waived opening argument and called Leroy Brummel as his first witness, who
testified as follows. Brummel owned several rental properties in the City of DeKalb and served as
property manager. Brummel had been a registered landlord with the City of DeKalb for the past
eight years. Brummel entered into a lease agreement with plaintiff for unit 25 in a building with
14 units. Without objection, plaintiff entered the lease agreement into evidence. Brummel testified
that the term of the lease was from May 10, 2023, to July 31, 2024. Though Brummel did not
“know the exact date,” plaintiff possibly vacated the premises on September 30, 2024.
¶6 Next, without objection, plaintiff entered sections of the City of DeKalb Municipal Code,
§§ 10.02, 10.14 (DeKalb ordinance(s)) into evidence. When asked, Brummel was not sure if
section 10.02 of the DeKalb ordinance stated that rental agreements that conflict with the DeKalb
ordinance were void and against public policy. In addition, Brummel was not sure if his lease
agreement contained any “prohibited terms.”
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¶7 Section 10.14 of the DeKalb ordinance concerned the return of security deposits. When
asked whether section 10.14(a) of the DeKalb ordinance obligated him to return a security deposit
within 30 days of the tenant vacating, Brummel responded that his lease stated “45 days. That’s
just the lease I’ve been using.” Based on the 45-day lease term, Brummel was not sure if it was
“contrary to the” DeKalb ordinance. Brummel agreed that paragraph 23 of the lease agreement
required the tenant to pay attorney fees if the tenant was brought to court.
¶8 Brummel’s handwritten paper regarding the cleaning of plaintiff’s unit was also admitted
into evidence without objection. Brummel agreed that the handwritten paper did not contain a date;
Brummel wrote it “after” cleaning plaintiff’s unit. When asked whether he sent plaintiff “a record
of what date” he worked and “what hours” he “compiled,” Brummel replied that he “didn’t write
down exactly what day [he] did it and times [he] started.” When asked how he tracked the cleaning
time, Brummel replied that he “looked at [his] phone what time [he] started and what time” he
stopped cleaning.
¶9 A check written from Brummel’s “LLC account” on November 9, 2024, for $580, was
admitted into evidence without objection. The November 9, 2024, check was written the day after
Brummel handwrote the November 8, 2024, cleaning paper. Brummel agreed that plaintiff’s
security deposit was $800.
¶ 10 A letter Brummel received from plaintiff, dated October 21, 2024, was entered into
evidence without objection. Plaintff’s letter demanded the return of his $800 security deposit.
Brummel “just put [the letter] with the rest of the stuff,” and did not write plaintiff a check for the
security deposit the following day.
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¶ 11 On cross-examination, Brummel agreed that the lease agreement term for plaintiff was to
end on July 31, 2024. However, plaintiff did not move out on that date. Four or five days before
he moved out, plaintiff “gave [Brummel] a paper” that “said he’s moving out.”
¶ 12 Brummel identified “a copy of the accounting that [he] made for the damages,” the
“cleaning expense.” Brummel also identified a copy of the check he mailed to plaintiff, which he
mailed to plaintiff on November 12, 2024. Plaintiff never questioned the charges for the room
cleaning; Brummel “never heard from him.” Cleaning plaintiff’s unit took six hours of work at
$35 per hour, plus $10 for supplies. Brummel explained that the walls had to be scrubbed because
“there was grease all over them, all the woodwork and the ceiling,” and the carpet had to be
scrubbed with “bleach and carpet scrubber.”
¶ 13 Plaintiff testified next as follows. Plaintiff vacated defendant’s premises on September 30,
2024. Plaintiff provided a “notice of intent to move” in a letter that he mailed to defendant, which
was entered into evidence without objection. The letter was a notice of plaintiff’s departure, dated
September 26, 2024, notifying defendant that plaintiff would vacate the premises on September
30, 2024. The letter, which was notarized and sent through the “UPS Store,” contained a
forwarding address for plaintiff.
¶ 14 Plaintiff’s demand letters for the return of his security deposit were entered into evidence
without objection. The first and second letters, dated October 21, 2024, were identical and sent by
regular mail and by certified mail. The letter sent by certified mail was “[d]elivery refused” by
defendant. Plaintiff’s third letter to defendant, dated October 28, also demanded the return of his
security deposit. The refused letter prompted plaintiff to hire an individual “to serve the October
28th letter” to defendant. The individual was a private investigator who did “process serving.” The
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affidavit based on the server’s “service of the demand letter” was admitted into evidence over
objection.
¶ 15 Plaintiff received a handwritten letter from defendant in the mail that stated room 25 with
the following itemizations: wash walls for 1.5 hours, clean carpet for 3 hours, clean door frames
for 1 hour, and clean baseboards for .5 hour, for a total of 6 hours; 6 hours at $35 per hour amounted
to $210, plus $10 for cleaning supplies, which totaled $220; and, the deposit of $800 minus $220
resulted in a return of $580. Plaintiff admitted receiving a check from defendant for $580, dated
November 9, 2024. Plaintiff was not certain, but he thought he received plaintiff’s handwritten
letter and check about one week later.
¶ 16 Plaintiff left the unit “[i]n good shape.” Plaintiff vacuumed the room, wiped the baseboards,
shelves and locker, and cleaned the refrigerator. No inspection took place. Brummel did not do an
inspection of the unit when plaintiff vacated, because they were “in a hostile relationship.”
¶ 17 During closing statements, plaintiff’s counsel argued as follows. Despite being a registered
landlord of the City of DeKalb, several sections of defendant’s lease were contrary to the terms of
“the ordinance.” First, “section 3 of the lease” said that “the security deposit shall be returned
within 45 days of the termination of the full term and surrender of possession.” Plaintiff vacated
the premises on September 30, 2024, and DeKalb ordinance § 10.14 stated “that security deposits
need to be returned within 30 days.” DeKalb ordinance § 10.14(a) further provided that the
landlord was to receive a security deposit and was not to “withhold any part of that deposit unless
the landlord has within 30 days of the date tenant vacated the premises furnished to the tenant an
itemized statement of the damage caused to the premises and the estimated or actual cost of
repairing or replacing each item.” Plaintiff’s counsel argued that section 3 of the lease agreement
violated DeKalb ordinance § 10.14, in that it mandated a longer period than 30 days. Plaintiff’s
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counsel further argued that section 3 of the lease agreement violated the Security Deposit Return
Act under Illinois law (765 ILCS 710/1 (West 2024)), which also provided for 30 days.
¶ 18 In addition, plaintiff’s counsel noted that section 23. of the lease contained “unilateral
entitlement to attorneys’ fees by the landlord,” which were more “prohibited terms.” Plaintiff’s
counsel argued that “any landlord who knowingly attempts to enforce such a prohibited term or
includes such a prohibited term in a lease shall be liable for an amount equal to one month’s rent
in addition to compensatory damages, including court costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.”
¶ 19 Plaintiff’s counsel went on to argue that defendant was obligated by both state law and by
the DeKalb ordinance to “either return the full amount of the security deposit within 30 days or to
provide an itemized statement of the deductions within 30 days.” However, defendant wrote the
check on November 9, 2024, and plaintiff did not receive it until November 16 or 17, 2024, which
was more than 30 days “after the date he vacated,” which violated DeKalb ordinance § 10.14(a)(1).
As a result, having gone beyond 30 days, defendant was not “permitted to make any deductions”
and acted in “bad faith.” As a remedy, plaintiff’s counsel sought “twice the amount of security
deposit,” along with court costs and reasonable attorney fees.
¶ 20 Defense counsel responded as follows. There was not a factual dispute, but rather a dispute
of law. Though the lease ended on July 31, 2024, plaintiff stayed in the unit past the end date of
the lease, making him a “holdover tenant on a month-to-month tenancy.” Plaintiff stayed in the
unit through August and September 2024, and then sent defendant “a notice that he’s moving out”
on September 26, 2024. However, in a month-to-month tenancy, there is “a 30-day notice of
termination of the month-to-month tenancy,” which plaintiff failed to do. Rather, plaintiff provided
a “four-day notice,” which would have been ineffective to terminate his month-to-month tenancy.”
{R. 50} As a result, the month-to-month tenancy “continued through the end of October.” Plaintiff
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“physically removed himself from the premises before the end of his month-to-month tenancy, and
Mr. Brummel sent the breakdown of the security deposit deductions and the security deposit refund
check on or about November 12, which was 12 days” after the termination of his tenancy. Defense
counsel argued that “all of this talk about the terms of the lease and violating of the local ordinances
by the lease” was “a red herring.” The lease was gone, having ended on July 31, 2024. Because
plaintiff “did not give a proper notice of the termination of his month-to-month tenancy, and Mr.
Brummel gave a breakdown of the amount of the security deposit he was withholding in a timely
fashion based on a month-to-month tenancy in correspondence with the requirements of the
[DeKalb] ordinance and the statute,” defense counsel argued that defendant should not be subject
to “any of these draconian consequences” that plaintiff was seeking.
¶ 21 On rebuttal, plaintiff’s counsel argued that defendant’s utilization of a lease agreement that
violated the DeKalb ordinance showed bad faith. In addition, DeKalb ordinance § 10.14 referred
to “the date that the tenant vacated the premises,” which was September 30, 2024. Plaintiff’s
counsel argued that if defendant wanted to “bring a counterclaim for the rent through the 30 days
because he didn’t get a proper 30-day notice, he’s welcome to” do so, but did not. Plaintiff’s
counsel argued that the “security deposit just talk[ed] about the date the tenant vacated,” as
opposed to the date the tenancy “might have ended had [plaintiff] provided a proper 30-day
notice.” In other words, plaintiff’s counsel argued that to pick a date other than September 30,
2024, “to start counting the 30 days” was “inappropriate.”
¶ 22 At this point, the court inquired of plaintiff’s counsel whether “this was a month-to-month
tenancy situation after” the July 31, 2024, date, to which plaintiff’s counsel replied, “That’s correct,
Judge. It continued as a month-to-month tenancy.” At the outset, the court agreed “with much of
what both” parties had said. On the one hand, there was a lease that did not “entirely comport with
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the City of DeKalb ordinance.” On the other hand, “when the written lease no longer really exists
because it’s ended, although it in certain respects defines” the “business relationship between the
two parties, and there’s no dispute that the month-to-month tenancy was created, and having stayed
or not given the notice, there being a 30-day notice required to end the tenancy,” the issue was
whether plaintiff’s notice that he was vacating started the 30-day timeframe. Assuming the 30-day
timeframe had begun, the court did not think “that the tenant gets to shorten that or end that on
their own volition.” Thus, the court concluded that the right to occupancy did not end when
plaintiff “actually moved out,” meaning the court did not “find that the landlord’s obligation to
comply with the 30 days ended sooner than the right to occupancy ended.” As a result, the return
of the “documents about the cost to clean up the premises and the return of the portion of the
security deposit” was not “untimely.” Concluding that neither party acted in bad faith, the court
found for defendant. Plaintiff timely appealed.
¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 24 On appeal, plaintiff’s first argument “is to show that there was a violation of municipal law
by the landlord, but that his responsibility was to follow the law.” Plaintiff argues that the return
of his security deposit was not timely under either the DeKalb ordinance or state law. Plaintiff then
frames his “second argument” as “a rebuttal to claims of the defense, including why the defense
should have filed a counterclaim within the same trial.” At the outset, we note that defendant has
not filed an appellee’s brief. However, because “the record is simple and the claimed errors are
such that [we] can easily decide them without the aid of an appellee’s brief,” we proceed to the
merits. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133
(1976). Further, because the facts in this case are essentially undisputed, our review of the trial
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court’s ruling in favor of defendant is de novo. See In re Marriage of Hughes, 322 Ill. App. 3d 815,
819 (2001).
¶ 25 Plaintiff’s first argument regarding the return of his security deposit is premised on DeKalb
ordinance §10.14(a), which provides that a landlord who has received a security deposit from a
tenant to secure the payment or to compensate for damage to the rental unit rent may not withhold
any part of that deposit as compensation for property damage unless the landlord has, within thirty
(30) days of the date that the tenant vacated the premises, furnished to the tenant, delivered in
person, by mail directed to the tenant’s last known address, or by electronic mail, an itemized
statement of the damage allegedly cause to the premises and the estimated or actual cost for
repairing or replacing each item on that statement. Similarly, plaintiff relies on the Security Deposit
Return Act, which provides that except as provided in subsection (b), a lessor of residential real
property who has received a security deposit from a lessee to secure the payment of rent or to
compensate for damage to the leased premises may not withhold any part of that deposit as
reimbursement for property damage unless the lessor has, within 30 days of the date that the lessee
vacated the leased premises or within 30 days of the date the lessee's right of possession ends,
whichever is later, furnished to the lessee an itemized statement of the damage allegedly caused to
the leased premises. 765 ILCS 710/1 (West 2024).
¶ 26 In the present case, it is undisputed that plaintiff’s lease terminated on July 31, 2024, but
plaintiff did not vacate the unit until September 30, 2024. It is also undisputed that plaintiff gave
notice of his intent to vacate the unit on September 26, 2024, and that Brummel wrote a
handwritten letter itemizing and deducting the cleaning expenses from plaintiff’s security deposit.
Brummel’s handwritten letter was mailed to plaintiff around November 12, 2024, as well as a
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check (dated November 9, 2024) for $580 for the return of plaintiff’s security deposit. Plaintiff
then received Brummel’s handwritten letter and check approximately one week later.
¶ 27 While the lease is silent on this issue, both parties agreed at trial that plaintiff’s failure to
vacate the premises on July 31, 2024, the expiration date of the lease, created a month-to-month
tenancy. Significantly, plaintiff’s counsel agreed, based on the trial court’s questioning before
issuing a ruling, that the lease “continued [beyond the expiration date] as a month-to-month
tenancy.” As this court explained in Roth v. Dillavou, 359 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1027(2005), the parties’ conduct may create a month-to-month tenancy, and acceptance of monthly rental payments by the landlord will generally create a month-to-month tenancy. Id.; see also Hoefler v. Erickson,331 Ill. App. 577, 584
(1947) (“it is the holding over and paying the same rent, without further agreement, that creates a tenancy from month to month”). Thus, assuming that plaintiff paid rent to defendant in August and September 2024, such conduct created a month-to-month tenancy. See A.O. Smith Corp. v. Kaufman Grain Co.,231 Ill. App. 3d 390, 399
(1992) (acceptance of monthly rental payments by the landlord will generally create a month-to-month tenancy); Dobsons Inc. v. Oak Park Nat. Bank,86 Ill. App. 3d 200, 204
(1980) (payment of rent on a month-to-month basis in the absence of a contrary agreement gives rise to a month-to-month tenancy). ¶ 28 Given plaintiff’s admission that the expired lease continued as a month-to-month tenancy, plaintiff was required to give 30 days’ notice to terminate the lease. See A.O. Smith Corp.,231 Ill. App. 3d at 399
(a month-to-month tenancy can last indefinitely but can be terminated on 30 days’ notice); see also Roth,359 Ill. App. 3d at 1027
(same). However, in the instant matter, plaintiff
failed to give 30 days’ notice to terminate the lease; rather he gave only four days’ notice, in that
he gave notice on September 26, 2024, and then moved out on September 30, 2024. Thus, as the
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trial court found, plaintiff’s four-day notice was ineffective to terminate his month-to-month
tenancy, which technically lasted through the end of October 2024.
¶ 29 In this regard, we agree with the trial court that plaintiff’s reliance on the date he vacated
the unit, September 30, 2024, to start the 30-day clock for the return of his security deposit was
improper. As the trial court determined, plaintiff was not allowed “to shorten that [30-day period]
or end that” period on his “own volition.” Rather, the right to occupancy did not end when plaintiff
moved out on September 30, 2024, meaning that defendant’s 30-day period to return the security
deposit continued through October 2024.
¶ 30 Plaintiff’s reliance on cases involving other types of tenancy, such as a holdover tenant or
a tenant at sufferance, is unavailing given plaintiff’s express admission at trial that the lease
“continued as a month-to-month tenancy.” See WC Media, Inc. v. Village of Gilberts, 2020 IL App
(2d) 190250, ¶ 22 (it is well settled that the theory upon which a case is tried in the lower court
cannot be changed on review). Indeed, consistent with the admission that the lease continued as a
month-to-month tenancy, plaintiff’s counsel recognized that defendant could have brought a
counterclaim for the rent through October 2024, based on the lack of “a proper 30-day notice”
from plaintiff, but defendant failed to do so. Given that defendant did not seek a rent payment from
plaintiff for the month of October, there is no merit to plaintiff’s second argument regarding “why
the defense should have filed a counterclaim within the same trial.”
¶ 31 In sum, because plaintiff’s month-to-month tenancy extended his potential occupancy
through October 2024, we agree with the trial court’s finding that defendant complied with the 30-
day requirement in DeKalb ordinance § 10.14(a) and the statute when returning plaintiff’s security
deposit, albeit with itemized deductions. Thus, contrary to plaintiff’s argument, defendant’s return
of the security deposit was not untimely.
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¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 33 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of DeKalb County.
¶ 34 Affirmed.
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