Valdez v. State

OPINION

This appeal arises from a jury verdict finding appellant guilty of burglary of a vehicle; the trial court assessed his punishment at five years confinement.

Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding of guilt.

The indictment returned against appellant alleged in pertinent part, that he did “intentionally and knowingly break into and enter a vehicle .. . without the effective consent of Fermín Perez, the owner ... and with intent then and there to commit the offense of theft....”

The record reflects that there were no witnesses to the offense. The State presented the testimony of the complaining witness, Fermín Perez, who stated that on December 2, 1976, he left his 1957 Ford automobile unlocked with the windows down outside a bowling alley. Before Perez left his car, he engaged a warning device which would cause the horn to blow if the vehicle were entered. Upon hearing the warning device, Perez went outside, noticing the door to his car was open and saw his “C.B. head set” had been thrown over the front seat into the back. He replaced the C.B., closed the door and went back inside.

*318The next morning, Perez noticed that a tape deck speaker box which had contained approximately fifteen tapes was missing and reported the burglary to the police. Ultimately, eleven tapes were returned to Perez and he was paid $60.00 for the unre-covered tapes and speaker box.

The defense evidence consisted of the testimony of appellant and his neighbor, seventeen year old Lupe Gutierrez.1 According to these witnesses, on the day of the burglary they had gone “riding around” in appellant’s car and then to the bowling alley where they stayed for half an hour. When they decided to leave, appellant walked out first and was almost to his car 2 when he heard a “loud horn.” According to appellant, he looked back, and “Lupe was coming to my car with the speaker box that the tapes were in.” Gutierrez testified as follows:

I just saw the tapes in the car and I got in there and I took the tapes. * * * I grabbed the tapes. And I guess it was wired or something and the alarm went off. * * * I just ran to [appellant’s] car.

Q: Now had you and [appellant], while you were inside the bowling alley, had you talked at all about doing this? * * *

A: No....

Q: He had no knowledge that you were going to do this?

A: No sir. I don’t think so.

Q: Had you indicated anything to him about this?

A: No, I didn’t.

Q: Had you decided to do this when you went into the bowling alley?

A: I just saw them when I walked in, but I didn’t tell him anything.

* * * * * #

Q: What did you do with the speaker box?

A: I threw it. I threw it out.

Q: How about the tapes?

A: I kept the tapes.

Q: You kept all the tapes?

A: Yeah, I kept them all.

Q: Did you give any to Mr. Valdez?

A: No, I didn’t.

* * * * * *

Q: Did he at anytime ask you for any of the tapes?

A: No, he didn’t.

On cross-examination, Gutierrez was asked:

Q: So [appellant] did know you burglarized a car and he did help you, carry you away and the stolen goods away, didn’t he?

A: Yes, sir. We left in his car.

Q: He aided you in getting away with the goods you had stolen, and he knew you had stole them because he was there, present when you stole them?

Yes, sir. >

And you were sixteen and he was twenty-one, is that correct? £>

That’s correct. >

Appellant gave virtually identical testimony. It was also brought out before the jury that on December 6th, Bee County Deputy Sheriff Eddie Hons spoke with Lupe Gutierrez and recovered about six eight track stereo tapes. On December 8th, Hons contacted appellant at work and asked him to come by the Sheriff’s Office which appellant did. Hons informed appellant that he knew about the burglary and after discussing it for a while, appellant gave Hons a statement.3 Hons testified *319that he did not arrest appellant because “he indicated . .. that he was going to try to help to get the rest of the property back to the victim, Mr. Perez.” On cross-examination appellant admitted that after talking with Hons he did not believe he was seriously implicated in the burglary, and in attempting to give Hons a full description of what happened, he included several things Gutierrez had told him, but of which he had no personal knowledge. According to Hons, he returned the six tapes recovered from Gutierrez to Perez; according to Perez, about a week after the burglary, appellant and Gutierrez returned four or five 4 more tapes to the victim at his home. It was also established that appellant and his father gave Perez a check for $60.00 in about May of 1977 to pay for any unrecov-ered tapes, as well as the speaker box.

The trial court charged the jury as to the law of parties pursuant to § 7.02(a)(2),5 and a verdict of guilty was returned.

The State contends that in appellant’s written confession, he admitted his participation “with his juvenile companion in his carrying away of the stolen property and flight from the burglary scene. Further, appellant was found to have been in possession of property taken in the burglary shortly after the burglary occurred.”

It is true that an inference or presumption of a defendant’s guilt of a burglary or theft sufficient to sustain a conviction may arise from his possession of property stolen or taken in a recent burglary; however, to warrant such an inference or presumption of guilt from the circumstances of possession alone, such possession must be personal, recent, unexplained and must involve a distinct and conscious assertion of right to the property by the accused. Rodriguez v. State, 549 S.W.2d 747 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).

In the instant case, both appellant and Gutierrez consistently denied that appellant’s “taking” — as recited by his statement — was intentional, but rather, that Gutierrez had inadvertently “left” two of the stolen tapes in appellant’s car. Appellant further explained on cross-examination:

Q: And you took part of the tapes, and he took part of the tapes, isn’t that correct?

A: No, sir. Two tapes were found in my car.

Q: Well, didn’t you take them?

A: No, sir. I didn’t take them. They were found in my car. I didn’t take them.

Q: Didn’t you tell [Deputy] Hons, “I took two of the tapes and Lupe took about ten tapes?”

Q: Well, it’s not the same thing, and you know it, Mr. Valdez, don’t you?

A: That’s just about the same thing, isn’t it?

*320A: Well, they were left in my ear.

They were in my belonging.

Appellant’s explanation of his possession of the recently stolen tapes was reasonable 6 and uncontradieted; this, coupled with his action in returning the tapes in his possession to their rightful owner render his recent possession of the tapes insufficient to warrant an inference of guilt. Compare Mulchahey v. State, 574 S.W.2d 112 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).

If appellant is a party to the burglary, it is by virtue of § 7.02(a)(2), V.T.C.A. Penal Code. See n. 5, supra. Therefore the question remains whether the evidence could reasonably be interpreted by the jury as showing participation in the event sufficient to render him guilty as a party. Suff v. State, 531 S.W.2d 814 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). The provisions of § 7.01, V.T.C.A. Penal Code abolished the distinction formerly made between “principals” and “accomplices” by Articles 65 and 70, Vernon’s Ann. P.C. 1925. Easter v. State, 536 S.W.2d 223 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).

Under the former Penal Code,

[t]o be guilty of a felony offense as a principal, a defendant must be actually present at the time of its commission or if not present, ... he must at the time the act is being done, be himself actively engaged in the furtherance of the common purpose and design at some other place.

Robinson v. State, 493 S.W.2d 780, 782 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). See also Ex parte Prior, 540 5.W.2d 723 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).

Here, there is no showing whatever that appellant had any purpose or design in common with Gutierrez to enter Perez’ vehicle with the intent to commit theft. “As to those situations in which one may be guilty as a principal when actually present, the very least that is required is, in addition to physical presence, encouragement by words or agreement to the commission of the offense. Such agreement must be prior to or contemporaneous with the criminal event.” Suff, supra, at 817.

Here, it is uncontradicted that appellant’s acts occurred after the commission of the burglary was completed by Gutierrez. The former Penal Code’s provision that an “accessory” 7 was a party to a crime has been eliminated; the conduct formerly constituting accessory acts is proscribed in the new Penal Code by § 38.05 which defines a separate and distinct crime of “hindering apprehension or prosecution.” 8 Wygal v. State, 555 S.W.2d 465 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Easter, supra.

It clearly follows that a person’s “accessory” conduct is no longer recognized under Texas law as conduct making him a party to the crime with which the accused was here charged. If chargeable at all, appellant’s conduct would be more appropriately alleged pursuant to § 38.05, supra. See Wygal, supra.

For the State’s failure to prove both appellant’s intent to promote or assist the commission of the burglary, as well as his solicitation, encouragement, direction, aid, or attempted aid of Gutierrez in the commission of the burglary, this cause is reversed and the prosecution is ordered dismissed. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978).

It is so ordered.

Before the court en banc.