Unzicker v. State

This appeal is primarily concerned with whether or not the action is one against the State and therefore prohibited by Article 1, § 14, Constitution of 1901. We hold it is not prohibited as to other defendants than the State and reverse the trial court for granting motions to dismiss of those other defendants.

Under threat of condemnation, Alice Unzicker, a 79 year-old widow, entered negotiations with the State of Alabama through its Highway Department, to convey a right-of-way across property she owned in fee simple located in Mobile County. The written agreement, to deed a right-of-way, signed by Mrs. Unzicker, in 1964, provided in pertinent part:

“1. That a certain tract of land known as Tract Number 63, a description of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof, shall be deeded by the party of the second part to the party of the first part for the purpose of construction of a public road.

“2. The party of the first part shall pay to the party of the second part the sum of $13,055.00 Dollars upon the proper execution and delivery of a deed granting right-of-way over and across said tract free of all encumbrances, except as indicated in Paragraph 3 and/or 4 hereof.” (emphasis supplied).

Subsequently, in the same year, Mrs. Unzicker executed a deed supplied by the State, through its Highway Department, conveying a fee simple interest in Tract 63. The State paid the grantor $13,055, requested the tract be stricken from the condemnation proceedings and it was. Mrs. Unzicker died in 1967, leaving a will in which she devised all her real property to two of the plaintiffs in this case, John A. Unzicker and William L. Unzicker, Jr. In 1971, William Unzicker, Jr., conveyed, by deed, a V6th interest each in this property to William Un-zicker, III, Patricia Unzicker, and Jane and David Boyd. The four last-named persons are also plaintiffs to this action. In 1972, the State of Alabama, through its Commissioner of Conservation, Claude Kelley, executed an oil, gas and mineral lease on the property to C. Barry Greer who later assigned the lease to Getty Oil Company.

The Unzickers filed their action seeking a declaratory judgment to the effect that: the deed from Alice Unzicker to the State be construed to reflect that the State acquired only a right-of-way or easement; that plaintiffs are the fee simple owners of all the oil, gas and minerals in said property; that Tit. 19, §§ 1, et seq., Code, be construed so as to permit the State of Alabama in the exercise of eminent domain to acquire only so much of an estate as may be reasonably necessary; and the same statute is unconstitutional insofar as it permits the acquisition of a fee simple title.

The action was filed against the State of Alabama, Getty Oil Company, Claude Kelley as Commissioner of Conservation, George C. Wallace as Governor, and Ray Bass as State Highway Director. All defendants filed motions to dismiss, all were granted, either initially or on motions to reconsider. No evidence was heard by the court. Plaintiffs appeal.

There are five questions to be dealt with on this appeal: 1. Is the action against the State and therefore prohibited by § 14, Art. 1, Const, of 1901? 2. May the State condemn or purchase, in fee, real property for road purposes? 3. Under the allegations of their complaint, are plaintiffs entitled to attempt proof of fraud practiced upon their predecessor in title? 4. Do the pleadings show that plaintiffs have no standing to maintain the action? 5. Do the pleadings show the action is barred by the statute of limitations or by application of the doctrine of laches?

Two, three, four and five present genuine issues of material facts raised by the pleadings, that can be resolved only by trial of those issues and cannot be disposed of on motions to dismiss. Bowling v. Pow, 293 Ala. 178, 301 So.2d 55 (1974). That being true, and since the action against other parties than the State is not one against the State, there are no valid grounds to support the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint; therefore we reverse.

Article 1, § 14, Constitution of Alabama of 1901 states:

“That the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity.”

As a general proposition, an action involving property in which the State has a definite right or interest and in which a decree rendered would bind the State, is one against the State and cannot be maintained without its consent. Aland v. Graham, 287 Ala. 226, 250 So.2d 677 (1971); Southall v. Stricos Corporation, 275 Ala. 156, 153 So.2d 234 (1963). To the extent that the State of Alabama is impleaded as a defendant in this action, the action is prohibited by the Constitution. But, in a proper case, this same immunity will not extend to the officers of the State acting in their representative capacities.

In their complaint plaintiffs state:

“This is an action arising under the Declaratory Judgments Act, Code of Alabama, Title 7, Sections 156, et seq. to determine the rights of the parties as set forth hereinafter.

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“Plaintiffs aver * * * that the acquisition of said [Mrs. Unzicker’s] property by the State of Alabama was pursuant to the right of eminent domain set forth in Code of Alabama, Title 19 * * * that the acquisition of a fee simple title exceeded the authority granted the State of Alabama for the acquisition of rights of way * * * that if the State of Alabama were permitted to acquire a fee simple title * * * such action would constitute a fraud on the grantor in said deed * * * ”

With respect to the oil, gas and mineral lease executed by Claude Kelley, as Commissioner of Conservation, and approved by Honorable George C. Wallace, as Governor, plaintiffs alleged their acts “ * * * constituted an illegal assertion * * * of a purported claim by them on behalf of the State * * *. The acts of the Defendants were beyond the scope of their authority and under a mistaken interpretation of law governing eminent domain * * * and constituted acts not within their authority and which were injurious to the rights of others.” They further contend the Eminent Domain Statute was unconstitutionally applied so as to amount to a taking of property without due process of law.

While the State itself may not be made a party to such action, it does not necessarily follow that its officers, Ray Bass, Claude Kelley and Governor Wallace, in their respective capacities, are also immune. The essence of plaintiffs’ complaint is that these officers of the State acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority, or acted under a mistaken interpretation of the law. Such allegations bring this case within those not protected by Section 14 of the Constitution. Wallace v. Board of Education of Montgomery Co., 280 Ala. 635, 197 So.2d 428 (1967); Engelhardt v. Jenkins, 273 Ala. 352, 141 So.2d 193 (1962); Finnell v. Pitts, 222 Ala. 290, 132 So. 2 (1930).

Defendant Getty Oil Company’s motion to dismiss was among those granted. As this is an action for declaratory judgment to determine the rights of parties under a deed to the land on which the lease was executed, and to declare that lease void, then Getty Oil Company, as assignee of the lease, possesses a material interest in the subject matter of the suit sufficient to make Getty Oil a proper party to the action. Tit. 7, § 166, Code of Ala. (1940).

Motion to dismiss the State of Alabama as party defendant was properly granted. Motions to dismiss the other defendants were improperly granted.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

TORBERT, C. J., and BLOODWORTH, MADDOX, FAULKNER, ALMON, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.

JONES, J., dissents.