Tascano v. State

This cause is here on petition for writ of certiorari supported by a certificate of the District Court of Appeal, First District, that its decision reported in 363 So.2d 405 is one which involves a question of great public interest. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

The trial court denied defendant’s request that the jury be instructed on the penalty as authorized by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.390(a). The district court of appeal held that this was a matter within the discretion of the trial judge and the court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury as to the maximum and minimum penalties. The question involved is whether the provision of the rules are mandatory or directory.

Prior to its amendment in 1977, rule 3.390(a) read as follows:

The presiding judge shall charge the jury only upon the law of the case at the conclusion of argument of counsel, and must include in said charge the penalty fixed by law for the offense for which the accused is then on trial.

The courts interpreted this rule as being directory and not mandatory with regard to the penalty instructions. Huckeba v. State, 322 So.2d 29 (Fla. 1975); Johnson v. State, 308 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1974); Kelsey v. State, 317 So.2d 445 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975).

The rule as amended February 10 effective July 1, 1977, reads as follows:

The presiding judge shall charge the jury only upon the law of the case at the conclusion of argument of counsel and upon request of either the State or the defendant the judge shall include in said charge the maximum and minimum sentences which may be imposed (including probation) for the offense for which the accused is then on trial.

The Florida Bar re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 343 So.2d 1247, 1261 (Fla. 1977).

We interpret this rule to mean that, upon request of either the state or the defendant, it is mandatory that an instruction be given on the maximum and minimum sentences which may be imposed. To interpret it otherwise would mean that the amendment was meaningless and accomplished nothing.

We must determine whether this decision should be retroactive or only prospective. Some trial courts and district courts of appeal have interpreted this rule as being mandatory, while others have interpreted the rule to be directory. One factor to consider in determining whether our decision should be given retroactive effect is the probable impact which such retroactive operation would have upon the administration of justice. See Annot. 14 L.Ed.2d 992, 1005 (1966).

The retroactive application of this decision would cast substantial doubt upon the validity of numerous prior judgments and would impose a great burden on the administration of justice by allowing cases to be relitigated. This is one of the factors favoring the denial of an unlimited retroactive effect to this decision. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965); 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts § 233 (1965).

Retroactive application of a decision of this Court is not constitutionally required and we have the power to determine whether our decision should be prospective or retroactive in application. Benyard v. Wainwright, 322 So.2d 473 (Fla. 1975). See also Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973); State v. Barquet, 262 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1972).

Under the circumstances we hold that this decision shall be prospective only and shall be applicable to all cases in which a jury trial is commenced on or after the effective date of this opinion. The defendant, as well as all others who have preserved this point on appeal, receive the benefit of this interpretation of the rule.

The decision of the district court of appeal is quashed and the cause is remanded with instructions to reverse the judgment of conviction and further remand same to the circuit court for a new trial.

It is so ordered.

ENGLAND, C. J., and BOYD, OVER-TON and SUNDBERG, JJ.^ concur.

ALDERMAN, J., dissents with an opinion.